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SUMMARY
With the growth of global interest in sustainability and social responsibility, more com-
panies and manufacturers have started practicing sustainable operations and social and en-
vironmental responsibility in their supply chains. Recent advancements in the field of
behavioral economics have uncovered many relevant insights that can be of help in under-
standing interests and motives among different entities in supply chains including suppliers,
manufacturers, policy makers, and customers. Utilizing both experimental and analytical
methods, this dissertation’s focus is to incorporate some of the relevant insights from be-
havioral economics into topics related to sustainable operations, circular economy, and
social responsibility in supply chains. The first chapter looks at replacement purchases and
buyback schemes by durable goods manufacturers. In contrast to the classical model and
conventional wisdom that ignore the relevance of framing effects in difference schemes,
this chapter explores the framing difference between trade-ins and upgrades and studies
how relaxing the equivalence assumption modifies predictions of the classical model and
provides predictions more in line with today’s durable goods markets. The second chap-
ter looks at social/environmental responsibility in supply chains and examines what type
of consumer reactions—encouraging ones that highlight the value of responsible sourcing
or discouraging ones that highlight the possibility of a consumer boycott—can lead sup-
ply chains towards more responsible sourcing. Our results enrich the normative model’s
insights and lead to a straightforward recommendation for NGOs that is also in line with
what can be expected from consumers. This third chapter, motivated by Best Buy’s recent
recycling program, studies the potential of a charging for recycling program from a circu-
lar economy perspective. We find evidence that, in contrast to the long-standing practice
of free recycling, charging for recycling can increase adoption of green electronics among
consumers. This chapter suggests that current environmental laws that prohibit retailers




Over the past decades, more companies have become interested in pursuing sustainability
and social responsibility in their operations and supply chains. Creating a discipline of
sustainability is a task of aligning interests, policies, and behavior among suppliers, man-
ufacturers, policy makers, and customers. Recent findings in behavioral economics can
expand our knowledge and understanding of dynamics between different entities and help
us obtain results more applicable to reality. Using both experimental and analytical meth-
ods, this dissertation aims at incorporating insights from behavioral economics into topics
related to sustainability, circular economy, and social/environmental responsibility in sup-
ply chains. Behavioral experiments sharpen our assumptions in mathematical models and
our discussions, while analytical methods allow us to capture these behavioral assumptions
in mathematical models, perform analyses, and come up recommendations for practice. In
three chapters, this dissertation studies three dimensions related to managing product take
back in closed-loop supply chains, improving social/environmental responsibility in supply
chains, and creating more efficient circular economy. The general theme of all three chap-
ters concerns bringing a behavioral lens into the problem in order to obtain insights more
in line with reality.
The first chapter looks at closed-loop supply chains and product take back by durable
goods manufacturers. Manufacturers of durable goods often offer replacement purchases to
customers to buy back older versions of their products from them and induce them to switch
to improved versions. Besides expanding the market for new versions of their products, re-
placement purchases are useful mechanisms for manufacturers in managing the quantity,
quality, and timing of their product returns. Recent market studies show that replacement
purchases have become extensive for many durable goods (for example, more than 50% of
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digital camera sales, and more than 80% of iPhone sales are replacement purchases). Clas-
sical model and conventional wisdom have long ignored that the framing of these buyback
schemes, whether through trade-ins or upgrades, can be relevant for consumer behavior and
theory. We explore the framing difference between trade-ins and upgrades, and study how
relaxing the equivalence assumption modifies predictions of the classical model. Our study
presents a stylized way of capturing behavioral influences in trade-ins and upgrades to fur-
ther incorporate in analytical models. Covering the common market settings, our study
provides insights for manufacturers practicing trade-ins and upgrades under different mar-
ket settings. Through controlled experiments, we capture the framing effect in trade-ins and
upgrades in terms of a shift in customers’ reference points. We then use the experimental
findings to extend a reference-dependence version of the classical model of trade-ins and
upgrades, to incorporate the framing difference between them. We find that the alternative
frames are not isomorphic, and that the framing effect induces consumers to switch which
prices they anchor to as their reference points when deciding a price for their current ver-
sion. Trade-ins (respectively, upgrades) put customers in a selling (respectively, buying)
position and result in anchoring to prices relevant to that. We also show that the behavioral
extension overturns key predictions of the classical model and provides predictions more
in line with reality. Our research highlights the importance of considering behavioral in-
fluences in modeling consumer decision-making in replacement purchases (i.e., trade-ins
and upgrades) and that it can help obtain accurate outcomes from analytical models more
in line with reality.
Taking the responsibility of their used products and returning them back into reuse or
recycling is a valuable step for manufacturers towards more responsibility in their supply
chains. Meanwhile, social/environmental responsibility in supply chains can go above and
beyond this by aiming to ensure responsibility from the starting point of supply chains. Nu-
merous examples of labor and building code violations in global supply chains have made it
clear that nonresponsible sourcing is an ongoing issue in globally expanded supply chains.
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The second chapter of this dissertation looks at socially/environmentally responsible sourc-
ing in global supply chains. This chapter examines what type of consumer reactions—
encouraging ones that emphasize the value of responsible sourcing or discouraging ones
that emphasize the possibility of a consumer boycott in the face of violations—can lead
supply chain partners to engage in more responsible sourcing. This question is impor-
tant for NGOs promoting socially responsible behavior among consumers to combat child
labor and labor code violations in global supply chains. The normative model in this con-
text predicts that only discouraging consumer reactions reliably incentivize firms to source
responsibly, as long as the salvage value of the product is not too low. Our analysis pro-
vides a more comprehensive perspective. We develop a behavioral model that incorporates
the dual sourcing bias in firms’ responsible sourcing decisions. Including this bias alters
some of the normative model’s predictions and results in more applicable insights. We
validate predictions of our behavioral model against those of the classical model in an ex-
perimental study. Our behavioral model predicts that an encouraging reaction, irrespective
of its magnitude, always increases the firm’s responsible sourcing when the discouraging
reaction from the market is weak, and further refines that a discouraging reaction always
increases responsible sourcing irrespective of the type of product considered. Our results
lead to a straightforward recommendation for NGOs to consider in different industries and
supply chains: in supply chains of products with no (respectively, many) substitutes, the
encouraging (respectively, discouraging) reaction is the most effective reaction to reduce
nonresponsible sourcing—a recommendation that is also in line with what one can expect
from customers based on the nature of the products.
Managing product return streams helps with the first step in circular economy, that is,
collecting end-of-life products and avoiding landfills. Yet, companies and recyclers face se-
rious challenges, e.g., not being able to recycle collected products in a cost-effective way,
in taking next steps towards full circular economy. The high operational costs of recycling,
especially for e-waste, have kept recycling rates far below an ideal point. Overcoming this
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challenge to create more efficient circular economy is, as emphasized by both academics
and practitioners, contingent on more recyclable products entering the economy in the first
place. Evidence has shown, however, that direct green-marketing to increase consumer
adoption of such products has not been a successful strategy, and as a result, retailers usu-
ally do not find investing in direct green marketing financially attractive. Motivated by Best
Buy’s recent decision to charge a flat fee to accept some used consumer-electronics for re-
cycling, the third chapter of this dissertations studies the potential of this counterintuitive
recycling program from a circular economy perspective. Specifically, we postulate that
charging for recycling, in contrast to the long-standing practice of free recycling, can pique
consumers’ attention to the fact that recycling is costly, and that recyclability is a valu-
able attribute in the product. Building on two behavioral insights, nudging and the theory
of planned behavior, through experimental studies we explore whether charging for recy-
cling can increase consumer adoption of green electronics, compared with current recycling
policies as the baseline. Our results show that charging for recycling, besides helping with
operational costs of recycling, can in fact increase adoption of green electronics by many
customers in regular purchase situations. Our findings have clear implications for green
marketing, recycling operations, and environmental policy. In particular, our findings ex-
pand previous research on tying recycling operations and green marketing and contradict
the conventional wisdom that favors free recycling as the beneficial bridge to coordinate
the two. Our findings also suggest that, from a bigger picture to circular economy, current




FRAMING EFFECTS AND THE NON-EQUIVALENCE OF TRADE-INS AND
UPGRADES
2.1 Introduction
In 2004, 82% of computer sales, 63% of cell phone sales, and 55% of digital camera sales
were replacement purchases (Gordon 2009). Moreover, 77% of iPhone 4 buyers and 83%
of iPhone 5 buyers upgraded from previous iPhone versions (Statisticbrain 2016). These
high rates of replacement purchases are mainly due to market saturation, and product intro-
duction cycles that are shorter than the useful life of durable goods. To expand the market
for newer versions of their products, manufacturers of durable goods have increasingly
managed replacement purchases separately from their sales channels for first-time buyers
and engaged in price discrimination between repeat and new customers, typically by buying
back older versions of their products to offer price reductions to repeat customers (Golson
2016, Kohler 2016). Indeed, Ray et al. (2005) showed that by offering different prices for
repeat and new customers, manufacturers could increase their profit by up to 40%. Re-
placement purchases have also become useful mechanisms for manufacturers in managing
their closed-loop operations through controlling their product returns. The success of any
closed-loop system depends on the efficiency of its product return stream (Li et al. 2011,
Tang and Zhou 2012, Dutta et al. 2016), and replacement purchases can particularly help
manufacturers manage the quantity, quality, and timing of their product returns (Guide and
Wassenhove 2001, Souza 2013).
Trade-ins and upgrades are the two common mechanisms for replacement purchases.
With a trade-in, replacement buyers are quoted a price for their current model when buying
its newer version at its regular sale price. With an upgrade, replacement buyers are offered
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the new version at a discounted price upon giving their current model to the dealer. In
standard economic analysis, the two mechanisms are isomorphic when the trade-in value
on the old model is equal to the discount value on the upgrade, and so they have often been
used interchangeably in the long-standing literature of trade-ins and upgrades (see, e.g.,
Levinthal and Purohit 1989, Van Ackere and Reyniers 1993, 1995, Fudenberg and Tirole
1998, Ray et al. 2005, Rao et al. 2009, Zhao and Jagpal 2009, Li et al. 2011, Agrawal et
al. 2016).
There is ample evidence, however, that customers’ decision making in replacement pur-
chases is driven mainly by behavioral influences (see Guiltinan 2010, for a good review).
In particular, the non-equivalence of trade-ins and upgrades can no longer be expected to
hold once one considers the framing difference between them: trade-ins separate the sell-
ing transaction of the replacement purchase explicitly, while upgrades embeds that in the
buying transaction. This framing difference resembles some of the seminal examples of the
framing effect provided by Tversky and Kahneman (1981, 1986), and is particularly im-
portant to study since observations have shown that, although a replacement purchase com-
prises two simultaneous selling-buying transactions for customers (Purohit 1995, Okada
2001), customers are more sensitive to the selling transaction than to the buying transac-
tion when making a simultaneous selling-buying (Purohit 1995, Hoyer et al. 2002, Zhu et
al. 2008, Kim et al. 2011), which is due to the behavioral anomalies in selling/giving-up a
product (Guiltinan 2010).
The framing effect, i.e., influencing people’s decisions through alternative representa-
tions of decision problems, has been established in many different contexts, from financial
investments (see, e.g., Kumar and Lim 2008, Cheng and Chiou 2008) to health decisions
(Gallagher and Updegraff 2012), and in both laboratory and field experiments (Hossain
and List 2012), and it has been shown that even experimental economists are prone to it
(Gächter et al. 2009). In this paper, we study the framing effect in trade-ins and upgrades,
and postulate that it would result in different evaluations of the selling transaction in a
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replacement purchase. We use shifts in the reference point to capture this framing effect
and the induced difference in evaluating the same transaction. The reference point is the
hinge of evaluating any transaction (Tversky and Kahneman 1991), and the reference-point
shift has been established as a proper mechanism to capture the framing effect (see, e.g.,
Heath et al. 1995, Lehner 2000, Hossain and List 2012). The main logic is that two alter-
native frames would induce different utilities if and only if they create different reference
points, through which they would result in different evaluations of the same outcome (see,
for instance, Hossain and List 2012, for a reference-point shift between base-salary and
enhanced-salary in reward vs penalty salary frames). Our first research question is thus
whether trade-ins and upgrades are different in terms of customers’ reference points for the
price for their current product.1
Similar to reference-point studies with multiple price-anchors (see, e.g., Baucells et al.
2011), through an experimental study (via Amazon Mechanical Turk)2, we extract the in-
fluential price-anchors, among the set of all potential price-anchors, on the reference point
with both the trade-in and the upgrade frames. Understanding what influences replacement
buyers’ reference points, and how it shifts with the alternative frames, reveals the lever-
age and the proper frame that manufacturers can use to manage their customers’ reference
points and thus their replacement decision. The straightforward application of this finding
would be in developing reference-dependence models of trade-ins and upgrades to inves-
tigate how the framing difference between them would matter for manufacturers’ policies.
Our next question is thus on exploring this through a reference-dependence extension of
the classical model of trade-ins and upgrades and revisiting the predictions of the classical
model in this matter.
1It is noted that unsystematic approaches, such as comparison of willingness-to-accepts with the alterna-
tive frames without a knowledge on the reference point, may lead to misleading results. For instance, for
a given pricing in the market, it is possible to observe comparable levels of willingness-to-accept with the
two frames, while overlooking the very possibility of customers’ use of different reference points (e.g., the
secondary market price or the new version’s price) to arrive at that willingness-to-accept.
2Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) has recently become a popular avenue for subject recruitment, and sev-
eral studies have endorsed AMT as a reliable source of experimental data (see Lee et al. 2018 and references
therein).
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We find that since the upgrade frame embeds the selling transaction in a net buying
transaction, it directs customers’ attention toward price anchors relevant to the buying po-
sition (i.e., the manufacturer’s sale prices), while the trade-in frame places customers in an
explicit selling position and results in anchoring to prices relevant to that (i.e., the secondary
market price). Therefore, the reference point shifts with the trade-in and the upgrade frame
as a result of anchoring to different prices regarding the induced positions with them. In
addition, different market settings influence the reference point with a given frame if they
affect the set of price anchors relevant to the induced position.
Furthermore, through a behavioral extension of the classical model of trade-ins and up-
grades by Fudenberg and Tirole (1998), we find that their two key predictions, that under a
high innovation level in the new version, the manufacturer will not continue producing the
original version, and that the manufacturer is better off in an anonymous market than in a
semi-anonymous market, do not hold anymore. Their second prediction, laid out through a
comparison of trade-ins (for the anonymous case) and upgrades (for the semi-anonymous
case), is a result of their first prediction, which is, of course, at odds with the numerous
instances we see nowadays wherein manufacturers continue production and sale of older
versions even under a high innovation level in the new version. For instance, Apple contin-
ued production of the iPhone 4s until September 2014, a full year after the iPhone 5s and
5c were introduced to the market. Similarly, the iPhone 5s remained available until March
2016, over a year after the iPhone 6 and 6 plus were introduced to the market.3 Market
segmentation and technology adoption are the common explanations come to mind with
overlapping production. However, the aforementioned overlapping productions exist even
though, driven by Apple’s very large R&D investments (Appleinsider 2016), new iPhone
series are produced with fairly the same production costs yet obtaining high consumer val-
uations and sale prices (Time 2014, 2016). This falls under the high innovative category by
3Sony continued production of the PS3 till September 2015, over a year after the PS4 was released. The
PS3 was not compatible with the PS4, which came with major (and unique) innovations, such as integrated
social gaming services.
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Fudenberg and Tirole (1998) (see Section 2.4.2) and rules out those common rational expla-
nations. Our finding uncovers an explanation, which has been overlooked for these cases,
that manufacturers’ another objective in continuing production and sale of older versions is
to manage the upgraders’ reference points through the sale price of the older version. This
explanation, which is salient in nowadays durable-goods markets with extensively grown
segment of replacement buyers, can only be obtained through the behavioral extension.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 covers the related lit-
erature and the research hypotheses; Section 2.3 describes the experimental design; results
and discussions are presented in Section 2.4, along with a comparison between predictions
of the classical model and the behavioral model in which the framing effect matters; and
finally, Section 2.5 concludes the paper.
2.2 Hypotheses
Since its introduction by Tversky and Kahneman (1981), the framing effect has been ap-
plied in a variety of contexts to manage people’s decisions, e.g., pricing contracts (Ho and
Zhang 2008), investment decisions (Kumar and Lim 2008), health decisions (Gallagher and
Updegraff 2012), and etc. Related to our context, Monga and Zhu (2005), and Yang et al.
(2013) found that buyers and sellers responded differently to the same frame. In this vein,
Simonson and Drolet (2004) showed that different anchors had different effects on buy-
ers’ and sellers’ decisions. Here, reasoning that trade-ins and upgrades differ in framing
the selling transaction for replacement buyers, through which they induce different (selling
vs buying) positions for them, and based on the common reference-point shift mechanism
(see, e.g., Heath et al. 1995, Lehner 2000), we postulate that these alternative frames result
in customers’ anchoring to different prices as their reference points for a price for their
current product. As a result, we expect that replacement buyers’ reference points will shift
from prices relevant to the selling position (with a trade-in frame) to prices relevant to the
buying position (with an upgrade frame).
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To narrow down this general expectation, we fit our problem setting with that of the
classical model of trade-ins and upgrades by Fudenberg and Tirole (1998), which has been
used quite often in the literature: A manufacturer (she) produces two successive versions of
a product over two periods. In period one, only the original version is produced and sold. In
period two, the manufacturer introduces the new version with a high or low innovation, and
offers trade-ins or upgrades to her former customers (i.e., replacement buyers) in addition
to selling to new buyers. Upon introducing the new version in period two, the manufacturer
may or may not decide to continue production and sale of the original version. This setting
creates four potential price-anchors for replacement buyers at the replacement purchase
point: the price they have paid in period one to buy the original version; its current sale
price; its secondary market price; and the new version’s sale price. The secondary market
price is the only price anchor relevant to the selling position, while the other three, coming
from the manufacturer’s sale channel, are relevant to the buying position, among which the
new version’s price is the one most directly relatable from the buying position. Therefore,
building on our general expectation, we expect that as their reference points, with trade-ins
customers will anchor to the secondary market price, and with upgrades they will anchor
to the new version’s price. Furthermore, with the separation mentioned before, we expect
that a change in the market setting will influence the reference point only if it is changing
the set of price anchors relevant with the frame (trade-in or upgrade). We thus present the
following Hypothesis on a comparison between trade-ins and upgrades:
HYPOTHESIS 1. With a trade-in (upgrade), customers anchor to prices relevant to the
selling (buying) position as reference prices for their current product.
With the problem setting of Fudenberg and Tirole (1998) as laid out above, changes in
three dimensions can impact the dynamics of the problem setting: the innovation level in
the new version (which determines whether the two successive versions, and their prices,
are comparable to each other or not); the existence or absence of an external secondary
market (which determines the existence/absence of a potential price-anchor for replacement
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buyers); and whether the manufacturer continues production and sale of the original version
alongside the new version (which determines the existence/absence of another potential
price-anchor). The latter two are changing the structure of the market as they add/remove a
potential price-anchor to/from the setting. The first dimension, on the other hand, alters an
existing setting through shifting an existing price-anchor along a dimension. Nonetheless,
we refer to all three dimensions as creators of different market settings. We next examine
the effect of each dimension in detail, as they change the market setting, on the reference
point with each frame.
Exploring the effect of the first dimension, i.e., the new version’s innovation level, on
customers’ reference points directly relates to previous research on manufacturers’ new
product introductions. Most of the research in this area is in line with our setting: a two-
period model with discrete product quality/innovation levels (see, e.g., Waldman 1996,
Kornish 2001). The need for studying novel directions in new product introductions was
first highlighted by Waldman (2003), and there have been extensions since then. Most
relatable to our paper, via an experimental study Okada (2006) found that there was a
significant difference in repeat buyers’ interest in a new product, relative to new buyers’
interest, when the new product was similar to their current product and when it was dissim-
ilar to their current product. This relative difference comes from a change in how repeat
buyers’ close their mental account for their current product (Thaler 1980, 1985) influenced
by the perceived (dis)similarity of the new product to their current product, which is rooted
in the general theory of similarity by Tversky (1977). Here, in our studying replacement
purchases, we relate this (closing the mental account for the current version) to a shift in
replacement buyers’ reference points for a price for their current version, driven by the new
version’s innovation level and its price (as the representative of (dis)similarity). Thus, ex-
panding on Hypothesis 1, we expect that customers’ anchoring to the new version’s price
as their reference point with the upgrade frame is the case as long as the new version is not
a substantial improvement over the original version, that is, only when it is similar and its
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price is comparable to customers’ current version. If the new version is high innovative and
thus cannot provide a comparable point of reference, customers will refer to their current
version and its current sale price, as the next most relatable price-anchor from the buying
position in period two. In addition, based on Hypothesis 1, we expect that this shift in the
reference point will only happen with the upgrade frame, not with the trade-in frame, as
it is driven by a change in price anchors relevant to the buying position, not the selling
position.
HYPOTHESIS 2. The innovation level of the new version shifts customers’ reference
points with the upgrade frame, while it will not change the reference point with the trade-in
frame.
The second dimension, the existence or absence of external secondary markets, is usu-
ally out of manufacturers’ direct control, but can be manipulated by indirect strategies (see
Hendel and Lizzeri 1999, for a good discussion on this). Studying the latent benefits or
harms for manufacturers in doing so is beyond the scope of this paper (on this topic, see
Benjamin and Kormendi 1974, Liebowitz 1985, Rust 1986, Levinthal and Purohit 1989,
Oraiopoulos et al. 2012). What we explore here is how the existence/absence of an exter-
nal secondary market will influence customers’ reference points with the two replacement
purchase frames. From what has been discussed so far, and in particular based on Hypoth-
esis 1, we expect that it will have no effect on customers’ reference points with the upgrade
frame, as it does not change the price anchors relevant to the buying position; however,
it will change the reference point with the trade-in frame, wherein the secondary market
price is the only price anchor directly relevant to customers’ selling position. For the latter,
with the absence of the external secondary market price, we postulate that customers would
anchor to a price that can provide them an approximate of what their current product would
sell for, that is, the current price of their product. This can be the case, however, only when
the manufacturer continues production and sale of the original version. With the otherwise,
none of the remaining price anchors can provide customers any direct (or indirect) informa-
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tion on the sale potential of their current product, and hence we expect no clear anchoring
to any of the remaining prices. We present these predictions in the following Hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 3. The existence/absence of an external secondary market shifts cus-
tomers’ reference points with the trade-in frame, while it will not change the reference
point with the upgrade frame.
The remaining dimension, whether the manufacturer continues production and sale of
the original version after introducing the new version, is particularly important with the
upgrade frame under a high innovation level in the new version, wherein we expected that
customers would anchor to the current sale price of their product as their reference points
(see Hypothesis 2). In this case, the absence of the current sale price of their product leaves
customers with the price they have paid for it, as the only price anchor relevant to the buying
position, and hence we expect customers’ anchoring to that. When the new version is a low
innovation, on the other hand, we do not expect that changes in this dimension would affect
the reference point as customers are anchoring to the new version’s price (see Hypothesis
2). Finally, based on Hypothesis 1, we expect that this shift in the reference point, driven by
a change in price anchors relevant to the buying position, not the selling position, will not
happen with the trade-in frame, wherein customers anchor to the secondary market price.
With the trade-in frame, it only matters in market settings without an external secondary
market, wherein, as expected in Hypothesis 3, customers are likely to use the current sale
price of their product as an approximate of what their product would sell for. Similar to
what expected in Hypothesis 3, in these market settings, with the absence of the current
sale price of their product, we predict no clear anchoring to any of the remaining prices.
We present these predictions in the following Hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 4. The manufacturer’s sale of the original version at the replacement
purchase point will shift customers’ reference points with the upgrade frame only when




To increase external validity of our results, we match the experimental setting with a real-
life situation: trading in or upgrading an electronic tablet. In addition, in order to capture
the time point of decision making in replacement purchases, we need to use an imaginary
situation: currently using a tablet and thinking about replacing it with its newer version.
This is a common approach in previous experimental studies on replacement purchases
(see, e.g., Purohit 1995, Zhu et al. 2008, Kim et al. 2011, Srivastava and Chakravarti
2011), and has been used in other decision-making problems, as well (see, e.g., Baucells et
al. 2011 for reference points in selling stocks, and Hardisty and Pfeffer 2017 for choosing
between present and future payoffs).4 Since we study reference points, we are looking for
the price that would make participants ‘indifferent’ about making the replacement purchase
transaction. Our approach is similar to that of Baucells et al. (2011) in their extraction of
reference points in selling a stock, where they asked participants for the price that would
make them “neither happy nor unhappy about the sale.” As Baucells et al. (2011) noted,
“Because of the pure psychological nature of the reference point, no ‘incentive-compatible’
variable payment could be used.” in these settings. Yet, since our experimental situation
concerns a decision about a physical product, to make sure about eliminating potential at-
tachment effects (and the price inflation it may induce), we apply the approach successfully
implemented by Purohit (1995), Zhu et al. (2008), and Srivastava and Chakravarti (2011),
and define the experimental situation for a third-party. That is, we describe a third-party
situation and ask participants about the price for that person’s current product that would
make him “indifferent” about the replacement purchase.
We start with the experiment for the trade-in frame. To reach to the reference-point
value in the selling transaction, first we need to keep the buying transaction’s utility (i.e.,
the difference between participants’ willingness-to-pay to the new version and its consump-
4There is also ample evidence that respondents’ decisions in imaginary and real situations do not differ
significantly (see, e.g., Carmon and Ariely 2000, and references therein).
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tion utility) zero. The otherwise would interfere with the procedure of reference-point elic-
itation. Thus, we provide the participants two purchase options that our third-party ‘Jack’
is offered: a pure purchase and a trade-in. The difference between them is our variable
of interest. With this setting, the price that participants think of making Jack indifferent
between the two options is the price they think would bring him zero utility in selling his
product, i.e., the reference-point value in the selling transaction. The experimental task is
described to participants as follows (the prices shown here are just an example):
Jack has a fully functioning Tablet 4.2 (a brief description is provided below), which he had
purchased for $190. A Tablet 4.2 is currently sold at $165. The average price of a used
Tablet 4.2 of the same condition as Jack’s is $60.
[Tablet 4.2 and Tablet 5.0 specifications were shown here, and are available in Appendix A]
Jack is thinking about buying a Tablet 5.0, and there are two purchase options available to
him:
Option 1) Store A sells the Tablet 5.0 for $270.
Option 2) The same store has a ‘trade-in’ program. That is, the store will pay Jack cash
for his current Tablet if he gives it to that store when purchasing the Tablet 5.0 at the same
price as in Option 1 ($270).
How much cash do you think Jack should receive to be indifferent between these two op-
tions?
To study the framing effect, we change the experimental question to the ‘upgrade’ frame
as follows:
Option 1) Store A sells the Tablet 5.0 for $270.
Option 2) The same store has an ‘upgrade’ program. That is, the store will sell Jack the
Tablet 5.0 at a lower price (p) if he gives his current Tablet to that store.
At what price p do you think Jack would be indifferent between these two options?
The reference-point value in the selling transaction here is calculated by subtracting the
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indicated lower price (p) from the new version’s price. The objective of our experiment
is to extract which one of the price anchors participants would refer to (as their reference
points) in deciding their indicated values under different market settings. Having enough
data points for each market setting, we can do so through investigating changes in which
price anchor has the most influence on the change in the reference-point value (see Section
2.4).
2.3.1 Market Settings
With the problem setting we study, the original version’s purchase price and the new ver-
sion’s price are potential price-anchors that are always available regardless of the market
setting. In contrast, the current sale price of the original version and the secondary market
price may or may not exist (depending on the manufacturer’s decision on continuing the
production and sale of the original version at the replacement purchase point, and exis-
tence/absence of an external secondary market, respectively). These create four possible
settings with different sets of potentially influential price-anchors (as shown in Table 2.1).
The additional dimension, i.e., the discrete innovation level of the new version (low or
high), creates two versions of each of the four settings. For them, we consider two new
versions with distinct low and high innovation levels and sale prices: Tablet 5.0 and Tablet
5.2, with the improved features and the sale price relatively high for the latter. Therefore,
in total we have eight market settings coming from a 2 × 2 × 2 design. We adjust the
experimental question for each setting by removing the part about the current sale of the
original version, removing the part about the secondary market, and offering Tablet 5.0 or
Tablet 5.2 as the new version.
2.3.2 Procedure
We recruited 1,195 participants (45.2% female; Mage=36.46, SD=11.62) in Amazon Me-
chanical Turk (AMT) and paid a flat fee ($0.60) for their participation. Participation was
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Table 2.1: Market settings and potential anchors.
restricted by location (the United States only) and acceptance rate (above 97% with more
than 5000 hits). The main advantage to using AMT is to access at reasonable cost a large
population of average people, and thereby to obtain responses likely to be closer to typical
market behavior. The majority of our sample had education beyond high school: 31.2%
had some college credit, while another 45.2%, reported having earned a Bachelor’s degree.
Nonetheless, the average annual income was in the range $25,000-$49,999.
After agreeing to participate in the study, participants were referred to an external plat-
form (Qualtrics) for the experimental tasks. Following some demographic questions, par-
ticipants were randomly assigned to either the trade-in or the upgrade frame under one
of the four market settings (created regarding sale of the original version × external sec-
ondary market, as shown in Table 1). Each participant answered two questions in random
order, one for the low innovation level and one for the high innovation level, with differ-
ent price sets.5 In indicating their responses, each participant sees a different set of prices
randomly drawn from the predefined intervals given in Table 2.2. The price intervals are
5The ordering was random and counterbalanced. Nevertheless, to ensure the reliability of the results from
using the same participants for both innovation levels, we performed a robustness check, by considering only
the first question that the participants answered, and obtained the same results (see Appendix A).
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chosen in a way that all possible ratios between the four potential prices anchors are realis-
tic, based on real market products and prices. For instance, the average secondary market
price is kept between 14% and 53% of the original purchase price and between 16% and
67% of the current sale price. Furthermore, the price range for the new version under the
high innovation is set to create relative prices big enough to signal the high innovation na-
ture of the new version. In contrast, the price range under the low innovation makes sure
of having prices close enough to that of the original version to resemble a low innovation
in the new version.
To help with the regressions we run for each experimental group (see Section 2.4),
while keeping the assignment process random, we assign more participants to the groups
representing market settings with more potentially influential price-anchors (e.g., more par-
ticipants to the experimental group representing the first setting in Table 2.1 than to the one
representing the fourth setting). This helps make sure that we have enough data points for
the regressions given the number of the independent variables in each experimental group.
Table 2.3 shows the total number of responses in each experimental group (we have rel-
atively more data in the first market setting in the interest of performing some robustness
checks; see Appendix A). We ensure the reliability of responses by applying filtering cri-
teria including an attention-check question at the end of the experimental task, filtering
obviously false data, and ruling out outliers using Tukey’s outlier criterion, i.e., responses
below Q1 − 1.5× [Q3 −Q1] and above Q3 + 1.5× [Q3 −Q1], with Q1 and Q3 being the
first and the third quantiles, respectively (Seo 2006). However, unless we have a strong
reason to filter false data, such as participants’ misunderstanding or responses of 0 because
participants were not able to enter a valid number, we leave the data cleaning to the outlier
criterion (e.g., we do not exclude any data because of the participant’s response time). The
final data loss is just under 19.8 percent, together with the attention-check failures.6 Similar
6It is worth noting that our attention-check filtering is merely to ensure if participants paid attention to
the descriptions, similar to pre-filtering of participants in lab experiments with test rounds. However, we
report the whole collected data since our attention-check question was set at the end of the experiment after
participants took the main experimental task. Pre-exclusion of these participants makes a data loss of just
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to reference-point elicitation by Baucells et al. (2011), followed by the main experimental
task, participants were also asked directly how important, on a seven-point Likert scale,
each of the prices were in arriving at their response. Answers to this question were mainly
confirmatory with no new insights, and hence we do not include them here. Therefore, our
analysis, similar to that of Baucells et al. (2011), is only based on the regression results.
We also asked participants about the clarity of the explained situations, on a 1-5 scale (5
being ‘very clear’), and the average scale value was 4.2.
Table 2.2: Price intervals (in dollars).
Table 2.3: Total number of responses in each experimental setting.
under 4.7 percent through filtering the outlier data. Our main results are robust to including the outlier data
in the sample; however, to ensure quantitative reliability of the results, we exclude them from the analyses.
19
2.4 Results and Discussions
Referring to Baucells et al.’s (2011) regression methodology in extracting the price anchors
with statistically significant influence on the reference point, we use a regression model
with all potentially influential price-anchors as independent variables, and the reference
point as the dependent variable. We use Hierarchical Regression (HR), which, among a set
of independent variables finds the ones with significant influence on the dependent vari-
able, to identify the price anchor(s) with significant influence on the reference-point value.
Regression models for the trade-in and the upgrade frame are as follows, respectively:
refTi = α + αoOppi + αsSeci + αcCurri + αnNewi + εi (1)
refUj = Newj − pj = β + βoOppj + βsSecj + βcCurrj + βnNewj + εj (2)
The refTi and ref
U
i are the extracted reference-point values from participants i and
j under the trade-in and the upgrade frame, respectively. The independent variables Opp,
Sec, Curr andNew indicate the original purchase price, the average secondary market, the
current sale price of the original version, and the new version’s price, respectively. Because
of the nature of the dependent variable, the intercept will not have a meaningful interpre-
tation (that is, when all prices are zero in the market, i.e., everything is free, customers’
reference points is zero as well) (see Baucells et al.’s 2011 note on the intercept in their
regression model for reference points). It helps, however, extract the influential anchors
more reliably and is particularly important when the intercept is the only significant part
of the regression’s outcome, which would mean none of the anchors explains the reference
point properly. Thus, we start running Hierarchical Regressions with an intercept, and if
only the intercept is significant we conclude that no anchor explains the reference point. If
the intercept is significant along with one or more prices, we take those price(s) to be the
influential one(s). If the intercept is not significant, in line with the logic of Hierarchical
Regression, we remove it from the regression model and take the outcome price(s) to be
the influential one(s). Finally, if the regression yields more than one significant price, we
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statistically compare their coefficients (using a z-test) to find the most influential price-
anchor. As the comparison will be between coefficients of different price-anchors, we will
use standardized coefficients to take into account the standard deviations as well.
In running the HR for each group, only the independent variables corresponding to the
potential anchors in that group (as shown in Table 2.1) are kept in the regression model.
If two groups turn out to have different influential anchors, we conclude that they differ
in terms of the reference point. If, on the other hand, two or more groups have the same
influential anchor(s), we statistically compare the influential anchors’ coefficients across
them to conclude their difference or equality in terms of the reference point. In the between-
group comparisons, we limit the regressions only to the extracted most influential anchor(s)
since only those anchors would appear in the manufacturer’s reference-dependence model.
We use a z-test to statistically compare coefficients’ magnitudes of the same price anchor
across different regressions (see Clogg et al. 1995).
2.4.1 Framing Effects and Influential Anchors
If framing matters, all else being the same, we would see different influential anchors with
the trade-in and the upgrade frame. Table 2.4 shows that this is in fact the case. As predicted
by Hypothesis 1, with the trade-in frame, participants anchor to the secondary market price,
and with the upgrade frame, participants anchor to the new version’s price, as their refer-
ence points. In addition, as Hypothesis 2 predicted, the reference point with the upgrade
frame shifts with the new version’s innovation level: when it is low innovative and its price
can provide a comparable reference-point for the current version, participants anchor to the
new versions price; in the high innovation case, however, the new version’s price is not a
comparable anchor, and hence participants anchor to the current sale price of the current
version, as the next price-anchor relevant to the buying position. It is also noted that in line
with our predictions in Hypothesis 1, regarding the influence of the three dimensions with
the alternative frames, the new version’s innovation level does not influence the reference
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point with the trade-in frame as it does not influence the price anchor relevant to the selling
position.
Table 2.4: Influential anchors on the reference point with the alternative frames.
Table 2.5 shows supporting results for Hypothesis 3 through illustrating the effect of
the second dimension, i.e., existence/absence of the external secondary market, on the ref-
erence point with the two frames. As predicted, with the trade-in frame, absence of the
secondary market price, removes the dominant (and the only obviously relevant) price-
anchor to the selling position. Thus, participants anchor to the price that, to some extent,
can provide a fair estimate of what the current model would sell for, that is, its current
sale price. When this price is also removed (see the two bottom rows of Table 2.5), none
of the remaining prices provides a proper reference-point for participants to anchor to. In
addition, as expected in Hypothesis 1, with the upgrade frame, the reference point remains
unchanged regardless of the existence/absence of the external secondary market, as it does
not change the set of price anchors relevant to the buying position.
In a similar manner to Table 2.5, Table 2.6 presents supporting results for Hypothesis 4,
which is on the effect of the manufacturer’s sale of the original version at the replacement-
purchase point. The most notable is that, as predicted, with the upgrade frame under a
high innovation in the new version, when the manufacturer does not continue production
and sale of the original version any longer, the next price anchor relevant to the buying
position is the original purchase price of the current version, and hence participants anchor
to that. Furthermore, as expected, it does not influence the reference point in the low
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Table 2.5: Influential anchors on the reference point with the alternative frames (effect of
the existence/absence of an external secondary market price).
innovation case since participants anchor to the new version’s price. Finally, in line with
predictions of Hypothesis 1, the reference point remains unchanged with the trade-in frame
as long as there exists a secondary market to create a price anchor relevant to the selling
position. In the absence of the secondary market price, the manufacturer’s not selling the
original version removes the price that was providing the participants an estimate of what
the current version could sell for. As discussed, removing this price leaves the participants
with no proper point of reference from the selling position to anchor to.
Discussion:
As seen in Tables 2.4-2.6, the effects of the secondary market, the innovation level, and
overlapping production on customers’ reference points depend on the frame of the replace-
ment purchase offer. They may shift the reference point with one frame, while having
no effect on that with the other frame. From the manufacturer’s point of view, the fram-
ing effect shifts her control leverage over the replacement buyers’ reference points. If the
manufacturer goes with the trade-in frame, she deliberately outsources that control to the
external secondary market. By choosing the upgrade frame, on the other hand, she takes
over the control and can manage her former customers’ reference points through her own
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Table 2.6: Influential anchors on the reference point with the alternative frames (effect of
the manufacturer’s (dis)continuing the sale of the original version).
pricing policy. Whether the manufacturer is better off with one frame or the other depends
on the circumstances. If the secondary market price is low enough and/or the cost of in-
terfering with that is not too high for the manufacture, the manufacturer may be better off
with the trade-in frame, while the otherwise can make the upgrade frame more attractive
as long as the manufacturer has the possibility of offering upgrades and adjusting her sale
prices accordingly.
It is worth noting here that although the secondary market price does not shift the ref-
erence point with the upgrade frame, its elimination seems to increase the reference point’s
value (through increasing the anchoring coefficient), as seen in Tables 2.5. The secondary
market price is the smallest number that participants observe in the experiment, and hence
its presence/absence may impact the range of values reported by the participants after an-
choring to the chosen reference-point. To examine this secondary role of the secondary
market price more carefully, we define a dummy variable for the existence/absence of the
secondary market and run the following regressions over the pooled data for when the cur-
rent sale price of the original version is the reference point (in Appendix A, we repeat the
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same analysis for when the original purchase price is the reference point and for when the
new version’s price is the reference point, and obtain similar results):
refUj = βcCurrj + βddummy Secj + βcdCurr × dummy Secj + εj (3)
The dummy variable dummy Secj equals one if participant j had the secondary market
price in her/his experimental question and zero otherwise. The Curr× dummy Secj is to
capture any variable effect driven by the presence of the secondary market price. Table 2.7
shows the outcome of this regression. We see a negative, but statistically insignificant, fixed
effect from the presence of the secondary market price. There is no statistically significant
variable effect either, which is in line with the result of the Hierarchical Regression.
Table 2.7: Effect of the secondary market price on anchoring with the upgrade frame.
On the role of the new version’s innovation level, first we note its exact opposite role
compared to that of the secondary market: while shifting customers’ reference points with
the upgrade frame, it does not change the reference point with the trade-in frame (see the
first two columns in Tables 2.4-2.6). Moreover, we find no statistically significant differ-
ence between the coefficients’ magnitudes in column-wise comparisons of the coefficients
(all p-values>0.080 in two-tailed z-tests).7 Therefore, when the manufacturer wants to
avoid any interaction between the new version’s innovation level and customers’ choice of
reference point, she can do so by switching to the trade-in frame. The main discussion
on the role of the innovation level is to highlight when it shifts the reference point with
7It is noted that, since column-wise comparisons are over the same participants, in order to account for
possible correlations in error terms, we also used Seemingly Unrelated Estimations for column-wise compar-
isons and found the same results.
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the upgrade frame. With low innovative new versions, the manufacturer is able to keep
the replacement buyers’ decisions only tied to the new version’s price, and hence has a
single control variable to influence both new buyers’ and replacement buyers’ decisions.
With a high innovative new version, in contrast, the manufacturer has an advantage of con-
trolling replacement buyers’ decisions by sale prices other than the new version’s price,
which, depending on the circumstances, can provide more flexibility for the manufacturer
in adjusting her sale prices.
On the role of overlapping production, the first part of Tables 2.6 shows that, as long
as there is an external secondary market, with the trade-in frame, overlapping production
has no effect on the reference point (nor does it make a significant difference to the anchor-
ing coefficients; all p-values>0.098 in two-tailed z-tests for row-wise comparisons of the
coefficients’ magnitudes). With the upgrade frame, the maximum role of overlapping pro-
duction for the manufacturer realizes when the new version is a high innovation, wherein it
shifts customers’ reference points from the original purchase price of their current version
to its current price. To examine if it has any influence on the magnitude of the reference
point under the low innovation case, wherein the reference point is always shaped by an-
choring to the new version’s price, we perform the same kind of analysis we did on the
secondary market price in Equation (3), using the following regression model:
refUj = βnNewj + βddummy Currj + βncNew × dummy Currj + εj (4)
The variables dummy Currj and New × dummy Currj have similar interpretations
to those of the variables introduced in Equation (3). Table 2.8 shows the outcome of this
regression. We see neither a variable nor a fixed effect on the reference point value driven
by the existence/absence of the Curr. This means that when upgrading to a new version
that is an incremental improvement, customers anchor to its sale price and are not affected
by the presence/absence of another, less relevant, price-anchor from the manufacturer’s sale
channel.
To summarize, the experimental results show that trade-ins and upgrades induce differ-
26
Table 2.8: Effect of overlapping production on anchoring with the upgrade frame under a
low innovation.
ent reference points, and that this shift in reference points breaks down the isomorphism
of the two frames. In particular, we found that among multiple potential price-anchors,
with a trade-in (respectively, an upgrade) frame customers anchor to the price anchors rel-
evant to the selling (respectively, buying) position as their reference points for the price for
their current version. The secondary market price is the reference point with the trade-in
frame unless the secondary market does not exist, in which case the current sale price of the
original version becomes the reference point (if the manufacturer continues its production
and sale at the replacement purchase point). With the upgrade frame, the new version’s
sale price is the reference point as long as it is not a substantial improvement over their
current version; otherwise, either the manufacturer’s current sale price of their version or
its original purchase price becomes the reference point (depending on the manufacturer’s
decision on continuing the production and sale of the original version at the replacement
purchase point). In addition, the existence/absence of the secondary market does not shift
the reference point with the upgrade frame, because it does not change the set of price
anchors relevant to the buying position. Similarly, as long as there exists an external sec-
ondary market, neither the new version’s innovation level nor the manufacturer’s decision
on overlapping production shifts the reference point with the trade-in frame, as they do not
change the price anchor relevant to the selling position.
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2.4.2 A Reference-Dependence Model of Trade-ins and Upgrades
Building on the experimental results, we incorporate the framing effect into the classical
model of trade-ins and upgrades by Fudenberg and Tirole (1998) to illustrate implications
of our results for theory. We do so through extending a reference-dependence version of
their classical model and showing that, in the presence of the framing effect and shifts in the
reference point driven by that, their key results no longer hold. Here, we only consider the
high innovation case as the results we revisit from Fudenberg and Tirole (1998) are made
under that case. Hence, the analytical analysis here utilizes only part of the experimental
groups among the overall 16 groups we had.
Our approach is to follow Fudenberg and Tirole’s (1998) assumptions and model struc-
ture closely, adding in the reference dependence in a simple way in line with PEEMs
(Portable Extensions of Existing Models) laid out by Rabin (2013a,b) (that is, keeping
the same structure of the exciting model in all the ways that are not the focus of the be-
havioral modification). It is also noted that to create a coherent connection, we stay with
the terminology used by Fudenberg and Tirole (1998) and explain the connection with our
terminology over previous sections whenever necessary. The problem setting is the same
two-period framework explained earlier. The original and the new version have fixed per-
unit production costs of cL and cH , respectively, where cH = cL + c∆, and c∆ indicates
the cost of incremental innovation. Also, they have valuations of VL and VH , respectively,
where VH = VL + V∆, and V∆ shows the value of incremental innovation. To avoid trivial











; and it is low otherwise. By normalizing the
costs and the valuations, we can obtain simpler representations of the innovation levels,
as in Fudenberg and Tirole (1998): cL = c∆ = 0 resembles a high innovation level; and
cL = 0 and c∆ > 0 represents a low innovation. Thus, for the rest of the paper, we set
cL = 0 and c∆ ≥ 0, where c∆ = 0 will represent the high innovation case.
There is a continuum of customers indexed by type θ ∈ [0, 1]. Customers receive utility
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from the product based on their type, e.g., a customer type θ = 0.5 receives 0.5VL and
0.5VH utility from the original and the new version, respectively. We assume customer
types are distributed uniformly on the unit interval. Customer segments are determined by
type cut-offs; for example, selling to customers with type θ ≥ θ1 in period one leaves a
volume of x = (1− θ1) new buyers in period two. There is no depreciation in the product,
so the manufacturer’s sale price of the original version in period two (if she continues
its production) is the same as its price in the secondary market.8 The manufacturer and
customers have discount factor δ for their second period payoffs. In line with Fudenberg
and Tirole (1998), we also assume VL > δV∆. This is a restrictive (and simplifying)
assumption; while it does not rule out all high innovation levels, it restricts the very large
ones, and meanwhile is very helpful with some of the mathematical simplifications.
There are two cases regarding the market information: anonymous and semi-anonymous.
In the anonymous case, where the manufacturer does not keep track of former customers,
customers can buy the new version by selling their current version in a frictionless external
secondary market or to the manufacturer (when she buys back). In the semi-anonymous
case, the manufacturer is able to track the identity of product owners, thus she offers the
new version to her former customers at a discounted price, called the upgrade price, less
than its regular sale price.9 As it appears, the anonymous case, wherein the manufacturer
keeps buying back of the customers’ old versions and selling them of the new version sepa-
rate, resembles a trade-in frame. The semi-anonymous case, on the other hand, wherein the
manufacturer combines the two transactions into a net buying transaction for the customers,
8This assumption of Fudenberg and Tirole (1998), though not being realistic, does not bring any qualita-
tive shortfalls in the model and its results, while simplifying the analysis significantly. The otherwise is just
a matter of depreciation parameter and making qualitative changes. Hence, we keep this assumption in our
behavioral extension as well and assume no depreciation (or desperation rate equal to one) in our model and
analysis. It is noted that since our experimental design was with the secondary market price less than the sale
price, our extension does allow depreciation (through a depuration rate less than one) if one wishes to expand
Fudenberg and Tirole’s (1998) model in that direction in the interest of quantitative results.
9Here, we ignore Fudenberg and Tirole’s (1998) “identified” case, where replacement buyers cannot hide
that they are repeat buyers to buy the new version as a new buyer, and where the manufacturer is therefore
able to charge an upgrade price higher than the regular sale price (this case may apply to services, such as
internet and cable TV, but rarely to durable goods).
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resembles an upgrade frame.
We start with the semi-anonymous case (i.e., the upgrade frame). The manufacturer’s
optimization begins with her production-pricing decision in period two, given the cut-off
θ1 from period one. Figure 2.1 shows the market segmentation. The θu is the cut-off for
the former customers’ type who decide to upgrade in period two. The upgrade price for
these customers is pu = θuV∆, coming from θuVL − pu = θuVH . The θH and θL, on
the other hand, are the cut-offs for the new customers’ types who buy the new and the
original version, respectively, in period two. It is easy to show that pH = θLVL+θHV∆ and
pL = θLVL.
Figure 2.1: Market segmentation in the semi-anonymous case.
With the cut-offs illustrated in Figure 1, the manufacturer’s profit function in period
two is as follows (note that cL = 0):
ΠS2 = [1−θu][θuV∆+λ(θLVL+θHV∆−θuV∆−αR)−cH ]+[θ1−θH ][θLVL+θHV∆−cH ]
+ [θH − θL]θLVL (5)
Where, θ1 ≤ θu.
The constraint θ1 ≤ θu ensures that the volume of upgraders cannot be more than
the volume of sale in period one. The λ ≥ 0 is the reference-dependence weight, and
with the special case of λ = 0, which implies no reference-dependence, Equation (5) is
identical to the classical model presented in Fudenberg and Tirole (1998). Therefore, with
λ = 0, and for c∆ = 0 (representing the high innovation case), we get their main result
that the manufacturer will not continue production of the original version in period two
(and hence, pH = θHVH). The general intuition behind this result lies in the perception
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that producing the original version in the presence of a high innovative new version is
useless. The behavioral model introduces an additional term, λ(θLVL + θHV∆ − θuV∆ −
αR), or equivalently λ(pH − pu − αR), embedded in upgraders’ utility function, which
represents their reference-dependence behavior: pH − pu is what the upgraders receive for
their current version, α ≥ 0 is the strength of anchoring to the reference point R (α = 0
means customers expect zero price for their current product and their reference-point value
is zero), and λ is the reference-dependence weight. It is obvious that adding reference-
dependence changes the optimal cut-offs and thus the manufacturer’s optimal profit. Form
the manufacturer’s point of view, the reference dependence in Equation (5) has a simple
interpretation: if the discount amount (i.e., pH − pu) is bigger than what the customers
expect for their current version (i.e., pH − pu − αR > 0), it brings a gain for them. Thus,
the manufacturer can charge them more, up to the amount pu + λ(pH − pu − αR), and
still make the transaction happen. On the other hand, if the discount amount is lower
than the customers’ reference-point value and yields a loss (i.e., pH − pu − αR < 0), the
manufacturer has to charge them less (i.e., pu+λ(pH−pu−αR) < pu) in order to make the
upgrade happen. In light of what the reference dependence adds, there could be value for
the manufacturer in sale of the original version in period two. That is, if the manufacturer
can manage the former customers’ reference points via the sale price of the original version,
continuing its production and sale in period two is now not useless.
Based on the experimental results for Hypotheses 1 and 4, with an upgrade under a high
innovation in the new version, two situations can happen regarding the reference point: I)
customers anchor to the current sale price of their product, when the manufacturer sells the
original version in period two; and II) customers anchor to the price they have paid to pur-
chase their product in period one, when the manufacturer does not continue its production
and sale in period two. Given that the sale price of the original version in period two is
significantly lower than its price in period one, we can assume that customers’ anchoring
parameter (α) to the original purchase price of their model would be lower than that to
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the current sale price of that model (which can also be inferred from Tables 2.5 and 2.6).
With this, we normalize α = 1 in customers’ anchoring to the current sale price of their
product, and 0 < α < 1 in their anchoring to its original purchase price. This will remark-
ably simplify the analysis and later the comparison between the semi-anonymous and the
anonymous cases, too. In addition, in the interest of simplicity, we assume λ = 1 regard-
less of loss/gain in selling the current model. These simplifications make no qualitative
changes in the outcome of the model, while making the behavioral extension possible by
adding only one new parameter (0 < α < 1) to the existing model.
From the first part of Table 2.6, and with α = 1, we replace αR in Equation (5)
with θLVL (i.e., the current sale price of the current version) that yields the manufacturer’s
second-period profit function (for when she continues the production and sale of the origi-
nal version in period two) as follows:
ΠSp2 = [1− θu][θHV∆ − cH ] + [θ1 − θH ][θLVL + θHV∆ − cH ] + [θH − θL]θLVL (6)
Where, θ1 ≤ θu.
Similarly, from the second part of Table 2.6, and with 0 < α < 1, replacing αR with
αp1 in Equation (5), we have the manufacturer’s second-period profit function (for when
she does not continue production and sale of the original version in period two) as follows:
ΠSn2 = [1− θu][θHVH − αp1 − cH ] + [θ1 − θH ][θHVH − cH ] (7)
Where, θ1 ≤ θu.
The manufacturer’s first-period profit comes from selling the original version to new
buyers, adding the second-period profit to which shapes the manufacturer’s total profit
function, that is, ΠS = ΠS1 + δΠ
S
2 (see Appendix A for deriving its mathematics). Com-
paring the manufacturer’s total optimal profit with and without overlapping production in
period two, we present the following proposition on the manufacturer’s optimal strategy:
PROPOSITION 1. In the semi-anonymous case, under a high innovation in the new
version, for α > α̂ the manufacturer is better off with overlapping production of the origi-
nal version along with the new version in period two.
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The proof is available in Appendix A. Proposition 1 provides an opposite prediction to
that of the classical model. The intuition behind Proposition 1 is straightforward and has
roots in the rationale that sale of the original version in period two can be useful with man-
aging the upgraders’ reference points, that is, the manufacturer continues producing the
original version and drops its price significantly to reduce the upgraders’ expectation as to
the price for their current version. Hence, for α of sufficient magnitude, the reference-point
value under overlapping production (θLVL) is lower than that under no overlapping produc-
tion (αp1), and hence, driven by the reference dependence, the manufacturer can charge a
higher upgrade price under overlapping production than under no overlapping production.
In addition, with overlapping production in period two, the manufacturer is not limited in
charging higher sale prices for the original version in period one, as she has the control over
the upgrades’ reference points through her second-period sale prices. This would in turn
increases the first-period profit for the manufacturer. Therefore, there are α′s for which the
manufacturer is better off with overlapping production in period two. Figures 2.2 illustrates
this by comparing the manufacturer’s optimal profits under overlapping production and no
overlapping production for all ranges of 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
Figure 2.2: Manufacturer’s optimal profit in the semi-anonymous case.
Figures 2.3 depicts the optimal solution, i.e., the optimal cut-offs, under no overlapping
33
production for 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. In the extreme case of α = 0, where former customers have
no expectation as to a price for their current version and behave like new buyers in period
two, the second period sale becomes independent from the first period sale, and as a result,
all cut-offs reach the optimal point of θ∗ = 1
2
. This is very similar to a situation where
the product’s life cycle is only one period. When α increases above zero, the manufacturer
faces the upgraders’ expectation in period two. To manage that, she reduces the sale price
in period one to keep the upgraders’ reference point low in period two. In addition, she
keeps the new version’s sale price high to induce a high discount price (i.e., pH − pu) to
the upgraders. The former increases the manufacturer’s sale in period one, and the latter
hinders selling to new buyers in period two. Thus, the manufacturer only relies on the
upgraders and does not sell to new buyers in period two. After a point, the manufacturer
cannot keep the upgraders’ reference point at low levels, because α is too high. Nor can she
handle the high reference-point in period two by increasing the new version’s sale price (to
increase the induced discount price). Therefore, she starts relying on new buyers in period
two; the bigger is α, the smaller are sales in period one and upgrades in period two, but the
bigger is the sale to new buyers in period two. This is reached by setting a high cut-off in
period one (θ1) and a low cut-off in period two (θH). For very high α′s, the manufacturer
is not able to handle the upgraders’ reference point, and hence starts relying only on new
buyers in each period, where no upgrade happens in period two, and the manufacturer’s
optimal profit reaches a steady point.
We next analyze the model of the anonymous case (i.e., the trade-in frame) in Fuden-
berg and Tirole (1998). Similar to the semi-anonymous case (i.e., the upgrade frame),
the manufacturer’s optimization begins with her production-pricing decision in period two,
given the cut-off θ1 from period one:
ΠA2 = [1−θ1][θLVL+θHV∆−θLVL+λ(θLVL−αR)−cH ]+[θ1−θH ][θLVL+θHV∆−cH ]
+ [θH − θL]θLVL (8)
The terms pH = θLVL + θHV∆ and pL = θLVL are the second-period prices for the
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Figure 2.3: Manufacturer’s optimal solution in the semi-anonymous case.
new and the original versions, respectively. The manufacturer sells the new version to all
customers (i.e., replacement buyers and new buyers) at the regular sale price θLVL+θHV∆,
she sells the original version to new buyers at price θLVL and, because of no depreciation in
the product, buys it back from the replacement buyers at the same price θLVL. The λ ≥ 0
and α ≥ 0 have the same meanings as in Equation (5)). With λ = 0, Equation (8) is
identical to the classical model in Fudenberg and Tirole (1998), and c∆ = 0 (representing
the high innovation case) yields their main result, that the manufacturer does not produce
the original version in period two.10 The reference-dependence term has the same effect as
in Equation (5)); it modifies the repeat customers’ utility function, and changes the optimal
cut-offs and the manufacturer’s optimal profit. From the manufacturer’s point of view, it has
the same interpretation: if the price paid for the customers’ current version is higher than
what they expect it to be (i.e., θLVL > αR), they feel a gain in the amount of λ[θLVL−αR].
Thus, the manufacturer can reduce the price she pays to replacement buyers (i.e., θLVL −
λ[θLVL − αR]) and still make the trade-in happen. Note that the manufacturer can also
increase the new version’s price (i.e., θLVL + θHV∆) in taking advantage of θLVL > αR;
10Note that although the manufacturer does not produce the original version in period two, new customers
can still buy it from the secondary market, and hence there always exists a cut-off θL for those customers,
and the new version’s price always takes the form ‘pH = θLVL + θHV∆’ not ‘pH = θHVH ’.
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however, she is limited in doing so because it causes her to lose the new buyers segment.
Based on the experimental results, with the trade-in frame, customers anchor to the
secondary market price as their reference points, regardless of the new version’s innovation
level or the manufacturer’s decision on production and sale of the original version in period
two. Hence, from the first part of Table 2.6, and with α = 1 (driven by Fudenberg and
Tirole’s 1998 assumption of no depreciation in the product and that the secondary market
price of the original version is the same as its sale price in period two (when the manufac-
turer continues its production and sale)), we replace αR in Equation (7) with θLVL. This
results in λ(θLVL−αR) = λ(θLVL−θLVL) = 0. Hence, we have the manufacturer’s profit
function in period two as follows:
ΠA2 = [1− θ1][θHV∆ − cH ] + [θ1 − θH ][θLVL + θHV∆ − cH ] + [θH − θL]θLVL (9)
The manufacturer’s first-period profit comes from selling the original version to new
buyers, adding the second-period profit to which shapes the manufacturer’s total profit
function, that is, ΠA = ΠA1 + δΠ
A
2 (see Appendix A for deriving its mathematics). It is
worth noting that, based on what we obtained in Equation (9), with α = 1 the reference-
dependence model coincides with the classical model. Thus, Fudenberg and Tirole’s (1998)
main result in the anonymous case, i.e., not producing the original version, holds with the
reference-dependence model as well. In comparing the anonymous case (i.e., the trade-
in frame) and the semi-anonymous case (i.e., the upgrade frame), however, the anomaly
between the predictions of the classical model and the reference-dependence model for the
latter brings us to the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 2. Under a high innovation in the new version, for α < α̂ the man-
ufacturer is better off with the semi-anonymous case than with the anonymous case. For
α ≥ α̂, both yield the same optimal profit through the same optimal pricing.
Proposition 2 is in stark contrast with the classical model, which favors the anonymous
case.11 The intuition behind Proposition 2 roots back in the previous result presented in
11The intuition behind this result of the classical model is that because of not pricing the original version
in period two of the semi-anonymous case, the new version’s sale price falls below the commitment price,
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Proposition 1, where the overlapping production becomes the optimal strategy for α ≥ α̂.
The overlapping production in the semi-anonymous case (i.e., the upgrade frame) pushes
the optimal solution closer to the commitment solution by creating the cut-off θL in period
two. Furthermore, since for α ≥ α̂, the reference point is θLVL in both cases (i.e., with
both frames), they yield the same optimal pricing and hence the same optimal profit (the
mathematical proof of this is provided in Appendix A). That being said, the baseline profit
in Figure 2.2 presents the optimal profit in the anonymous case (i.e., the trade-in frame) as
well. As seen, for α < α̂, the semi-anonymous case (i.e., the upgrade frame) yields more
profit than the baseline, because of its reference point being very low; and for α ≥ α̂, the
manufacturer can always obtain the baseline profit by switching to overlapping production.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
This study examined whether the conventional wisdom that trade-ins and upgrades are iso-
morphic was robust to behavioral influences in customers’ decision-making. The analyses
yielded two main results. First, experimental methods established that people change which
prices they anchor to as their reference points when offered the alternative framings of a
trade-in or an upgrade, and that different market settings have different effects with the two
frames, in terms of shifting customers’ reference points, depending on which price anchors
they change. Second, the paper shows that framing effect of the sort revealed in the ex-
periments, through reference-dependence mechanism, can overturn key predictions of the
classical model of trade-ins and upgrades. In particular, the paper shows that manufacturers
may prefer to produce older versions of their product concurrently with newer improved
versions, even in settings where the classical model predicts they would not. The addition
of reference dependence to the classical model therefore can explain observed coproduc-
tion of successive versions of products that cannot be explained by the classical model.
and hence the manufacturer never reaches the commitment solution. However, the secondary market in the
anonymous case, which creates the cut-off θL for the original version in period two, pushes the cut-off θH
upward, which in turn helps the manufacturer get closer to the commitment solution.
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This modification further contradicts the classical model’s outcome in comparing semi-
anonymous and anonymous markets, through a comparison of trade-ins and upgrades, and
shows that the dominant profitability of the anonymous case is not the case.
Our findings have obvious implications for manufacturers of durable goods who offer
replacement purchase for their former customers. The choice between offering a trade-in
or an upgrade influences customer’s choice of the reference point for the price for their
current version. Hence, manufacturers can choose the frame to direct their customers’
focus away from low potential reference-points and towards high profitable ones. Because
switching between frames is likely to be a low-cost tactic for most manufacturers, reference
dependence offers a flexible tool in managing the former consumers in a profitable way.
The extent to which manufacturers can interfere with external secondary markets and their
flexibility in adjusting their own production-pricing policies would determine which frame
they would be better off with. Finding the optimal frame and the optimal production-pricing
policy in each market setting, which better be done through internalizing the choice of
innovation level and the option of switching between the market settings for manufacturers,
was beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, we designed our experiments to cover all
possible market settings in line with seminal studies of trade-ins and upgrades in order to
provide inputs for future analytical research on this area.
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CHAPTER 3
STRUCTURING SUPPLY CHAINS FOR SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE BEHAVIOR
3.1 Introduction
Recent labor and building code violations, e.g., child labor by Nike’s suppliers in the 1990s
(Nisen 2013), environmental violations by Mattel’s suppliers in the early 2000s (Roo-
sevelt 2011), child labor by GAP’s suppliers in 2007 (Brown 2007), workers’ suicides
in 2010 at Foxconn due to poor working conditions (Barboza 2010), and most tragically,
the Bangladesh factory collapse in 2013 that killed more than 1,100 workers and injured
more than 2,500 (Al-Mahmood 2013, Yardley 2013), have increased the salience of so-
cially responsible sourcing in global supply chains. Unfortunately, sourcing from socially
or environmentally nonresponsible suppliers is an ongoing issue in global supply chains
(e.g., possible child labor in Apple’s supply chain of the iPhone X; Vega 2017). Based
on a recent report by the International Labor Organization, there are more than 152 mil-
lion children currently working in child labor (ILO 2017).1 The challenge of monitoring
and controlling suppliers’ compliance with social and environmental obligations adds to
the complexity of managing these supply chains. Consumers wanting their products to be
made in a socially responsible way participate in markets located far away from the factory
workers and managers responsible for the process that makes these products. Firms inter-
acting with the end consumers are, through manufacturers, suppliers, and subcontractors,
removed from the daily decision making that determines the conduct in such processes.
Creating a discipline of social responsibility in a supply chain is thus a task of aligning
interests, policies, and behavior among many globally distributed partners.
1According to the International Labor Organization, not all work done by children is classified as child
labor, and child labor is often defined as work that deprives children of their childhood, potential and dignity,
and is harmful to their physical and mental development.
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Operations Management researchers have started studying responsible sourcing in sup-
ply chains (see, e.g., Plambeck and Taylor 2015, Porteous et al. 2015, Guo et al. 2016, Chen
and Lee 2017, Huang et al. 2017, Agrawal and Lee 2019, Lee and Tang 2018, Bondareva
and Pinker 2019). The social and environmental impact of improving responsible sourcing
in a firm’s operation is discussed extensively in the academic literature as well as among
practitioners (see, e.g., Guo et al. 2016, Kippenberg 2018). The focus of academic research
in this area lies in studying the consequences of sourcing from socially/environmentally
deviant suppliers on buying firms’ profits and analyzing their optimal sourcing strategies,
mainly by investigating how socially conscious consumers’ reactions can increase the in-
terest that firms have in sourcing their products responsibly.
Based on the academic literature and current practices such as Fair Trade certification,
GoodWeave label, etc., we can differentiate between encouraging and discouraging con-
sumer reactions in the market: customers’ extra willingness-to-pay for responsibly sourced
products is an encouraging reaction that values responsible sourcing; and, in contrast, cus-
tomers’ potential to boycott the firm if a breach of responsible sourcing becomes appar-
ent is a discouraging reaction that denounces nonresponsible sourcing. Which consumer
reaction—an encouraging or a discouraging one—is more effective in terms of promot-
ing responsible sourcing? Answering this question is of practical value, particularly to the
NGOs active in promoting socially responsible behavior among consumers. For example,
GoodWeave is an NGO “dedicated to ending child labor, forced labor, and bonded labor in
global supply chains.” GoodWeave has created a “GoodWeave Label” that indicates a la-
beled product had no child labor in its production process. To make this initiative effective,
GoodWeave needs consumers to react to this label. Learning about the effects of different
consumer reactions in different industries and supply chains, an NGO such as GoodWeave
can in turn emphasize the right reaction in their communication with consumers to help
promote a target behavior (McKenzie-Mohr 2011).
For a product with many substitutes, the extra willingness-to-pay from consumers for a
40
firm’s responsible product may be limited since consumers can easily buy the product from
other manufacturers. Thus, in supply chains for products with many substitutes, an NGO
like GoodWeave may find it easier to promote discouraging reactions among consumers.
This applies for products like T-shirts, and everyday essentials, which are available in com-
parable quality from many brands and manufacturers in the market. However, for products
with little substitutes, consumers may have limited opportunity to boycott the product,
since they will not be able to easily find an alternative product from other manufacturers.
In this case, NGOs can more easily promote encouraging reactions among consumers. This
applies for products like coffee, rice, hand-woven rugs, etc., where unique taste and char-
acteristics of the product, often rooting back in its place of origin, makes customers stick
with the brand/manufacturer while willing to pay extra for the responsibly sourced version
of the product.
One of the seminal models of responsible sourcing in supply chains that analyzes the
effect of different consumer reactions on firms’ sourcing policy is that of Guo et al. (2016)
(hereafter, GLS). Through a stylized model of a “buyer,” a “responsible supplier,” and a
“nonresponsible supplier,” the GLS model provides a simple and insightful framework to
study the rational motivations of supply chain participants under different sourcing poli-
cies. This framework has been used by other researchers as well, see, e.g., Agrawal and
Lee (2019). The possible sourcing policies highlighted by GLS are low-cost sourcing (i.e.,
sourcing from the nonresponsible supplier), dual sourcing (i.e., sourcing from both suppli-
ers), and responsible sourcing (i.e., sourcing from the responsible supplier). GLS discuss
these policies extensively and provide examples for each sourcing policy (e.g., dual sourc-
ing by Whole Foods Market that sells multiple versions of meats graded on ‘responsibility
scale’, or dual sourcing by apparel manufacturers that sell ‘made in the US’ versions to-
gether with regular versions). The framework allows studying, for example, when a buyer
may prefer relatively more responsible policies (dual sourcing or responsible sourcing)
over low-cost sourcing. In general, firms may prefer sourcing from nonresponsible suppli-
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ers over responsible sourcing because they are cheaper (which results in low-cost sourcing);
further, they may prefer dual sourcing over single-sourcing due to the potential for price
discrimination and market differentiation (e.g., selling the ‘made in the US’ version at a
premium price in parallel to a regular version) (Guo et al. 2016). These two motivations
can work against responsible sourcing.
The GLS model and analyses, which we refer to as the classical model in the inter-
est of comparison with our behavioral model, show that among the factors influencing the
buyer’s sourcing strategies, only boycotting behavior by socially conscious customers re-
liably decreases the buyer’s sourcing from the nonresponsible supplier. In contrast, the
socially conscious customers’ extra willingness-to-pay (and the portion of these customers
in the market that determines the scale of this extra revenue for the buyer) can backfire
and increase nonresponsible sourcing. This result casts doubt on the effectiveness of an
encouraging reaction by the market. In addition, this insight can be of limited practical
value for NGOs, governments, and policymakers. Asking consumers to, for example, boy-
cott products that have no substitutes may not be feasible. Moreover, the classical model
provides conflicting advice on the effect of a discouraging consumer reaction in the context
of products with low salvage value. Specifically, the model predicts that increasing the
socially conscious customers’ willingness to boycott will push the buyer toward sourcing
from the nonresponsible supplier in an effort to avoid excess stock of an expensive, respon-
sibly sourced product in case of a boycott. The model thus does not provide a clear rec-
ommendation for products with low salvage value, e.g., perishables and fashion products.
Understanding how to promote responsible sourcing in the fashion industry is particularly
important given the prevalence of nonresponsible labor practices among suppliers in this
industry.
In practice, we find some evidence that dual sourcing is abundant beyond the ratio-
nal price discrimination and market differentiation that GLS assume. For example, with
Fair Trade certification, which emphasizes paying fair wages to labors at the sourcing
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farms/factories, dual sourcing is the dominant policy among the firms selling Fair Trade
certified products (see fairtradecertified.org). This dual sourcing, and hence selling both
regular and Fair Trade versions of products, is being practiced by many firms listed in fair-
tradecertified.org and for many products (such as coffee, tea, chocolate, cloth, furniture,
seafood, cereal, candies/cookies, snacks, etc.) even when the price difference between
variants is very low. In fact, customers’ extra willingness to pay for Fair Trade versions can
be low and as little as 8% of the product’s sale price (Hainmueller et al. 2015). It is thus
possible that this level of dual sourcing is not entirely rational, but is also driven by dual
sourcing bias.
The dual sourcing bias, which is documented in the context of sourcing decisions (Gur-
nani et. al 2014), implies that firms tend to source from multiple suppliers, even when
single sourcing is the rational optimal policy. The behavioral roots of the dual sourcing
bias are in diversification and variety-seeking biases (Simonson 1990, Read and Loewen-
stein 1995, Benartzi and Thaler 2001) and partition-dependence decision making (Fox and
Clemen 2005, Fox et al. 2005). Therefore, we develop a behavioral model to incorporate
this dual-sourcing bias into the buyer’s sourcing decision with the GLS model. Such a bias
may be generally present with the buyer facing two different suppliers. In our context,
this bias could be particularly salient since dual sourcing allows the buyer to segment the
market. In other words, we expect that the market segmentation potential created through
an encouraging consumer reaction will lead to the dual-sourcing bias. The GLS model,
by separating different sourcing policies for the buyer, provides us a perfect platform to
incorporate this dual-sourcing bias.
We find that the behavioral model we propose mostly agrees with the classical model in
terms of its predictions but does provide clearer advice in those contexts where the recom-
mendations given by GLS appear impractical or ambiguous. For these scenarios, which we
will outline in more detail below, we compare predictions from our behavioral model with
those from the classical model via a behavioral experiment, to test our behavioral model.
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Based on our analyses, we find that the encouraging reaction always (never) increases the
firm’s responsible sourcing when the discouraging reaction in the market is weak (strong),
and that the discouraging reaction always increases responsible sourcing regardless of the
product’s salvage value. These results allow us to make a clear recommendation for NGOs:
in supply chains of products with no (many) substitutes, the encouraging (discouraging) re-
action is the most effective reaction from the market to support responsible sourcing in the
supply chain. In other words, NGOs can fit their communication strategy with consumers
to the nature of the product.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the related
literature. Section 3.3 develops our theory and builds the behavioral model. The experi-
ment we use to validate our behavioral model is summarized in Section 3.4, together with
an analysis and comparison of the classical and behavioral models’ predictions. Finally,
Section 3.5 contains our concluding remarks. All proofs are presented in Appendix B.
3.2 Literature Review
Our research questions contribute to four streams of literature: sourcing decisions in supply
chains, socially and environmentally responsible operations management, market segmen-
tation, and behavioral operations management. We discuss these different literature streams
below.
3.2.1 Sourcing Decisions in Supply Chains
We study a firm’s sourcing decision. The firm decides how much inventory to procure
from a responsible (and more expensive) supplier and a nonresponsible (and cheaper) sup-
plier. Thus, our research is related to the literature of supply chain sourcing with multiple
suppliers. Because one of the suppliers in our case has an inherent chance of violating
social or environmental obligations, our research relates to the supply disruption literature
(see, e.g., Tomlin 2006). However, as GLS mention, the type of risk in the responsible
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sourcing decision differs slightly from the traditional risk of supply chain disruption. For
a buyer, the negative consequences of violating social or environmental obligations lie in
potentially losing a portion of the market. The disruption is thus effectively on the demand
side (i.e., loss of customers) instead of the supply side (i.e., insufficient supplies). Hence,
the common mitigation strategies in supply chain disruption, e.g., supplier diversification
and improvement (see Wang et al. 2010 and Kalkanci 2017, for a literature review), are
inapplicable in this context. Furthermore, driven by the socially conscious customers’ ex-
tra willingness-to-pay for the responsibly sourced product, there is a potential for market
segmentation tied directly to the firm’s sourcing decision. This segmentation aspect, which
contrasts with the traditional supply disruption problems in the literature, brings further nu-
ances to the firm’s sourcing decision. We study potential behavioral biases in this context,
specifically dual-sourcing and oversourcing biases (Gurnani et al. 2014, Goldschmidt et
al. 2014, Csermely and Minner 2015, Kalkanci 2017). Our paper also extends the work
on supplier diversification in procurement for reasons other than supply uncertainty (e.g.,
Chod et al. 2019).
3.2.2 Market Segmentation and Price Discrimination
As noted above, the socially conscious customers’ extra willingness-to-pay for a responsi-
bly sourced product creates an interdependence between the buying firm’s sourcing strategy
and its marketing strategy: The firm can practice market segmentation and price discrim-
ination only if it sources from both responsible and nonresponsible suppliers. A certain
population is willing to pay a premium for responsible conduct. A large body of the work
in the marketing literature is devoted to examining pricing and market segmentation strate-
gies (see, e.g., Moorthy 1984, Moorthy and Png 1992, Desai 2001). Broadly related to
our study, Chen (2001) studied product development and market segmentation of green
and regular products where a green consumer segment is willing to pay a premium for
the green attribute in the product. In the area of responsible sourcing, except for GLS,
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no work has studied both sourcing and market segmentation for responsibly sourced prod-
ucts. Inspired by the seminal papers in the marketing literature that look at behavioral bi-
ases related to diversification bias and variety-seeking behavior (Simonson 1990, Read and
Loewenstein 1995, Benartzi and Thaler 2001) and partition-dependence decision making
(Fox and Clemen 2005, Fox et al. 2005), we study how the existence of potential market
segmentation, through explicitly partitioning the market between socially conscious and
regular customers, would influence the firm’s sourcing decision.
3.2.3 Socially and Environmentally Responsible Operations
The academic literature on sustainable and environmental operations and supply chain
management is vast. Our study falls under the growing research stream of responsible
sourcing. Chen and Lee (2017) and Huang et al. (2017) reviewed the academic work in
this area. This stream of research is mostly concerned with strategies and policies to in-
duce more responsibility among suppliers (see, e.g., Plambeck and Taylor 2014, Porteous
et al. 2015, Chen and Lee 2017, Agrawal and Lee 2019, Bondareva and Pinker 2019).
Like GLS, our study focuses on a firm’s supplier selection and sourcing decisions and how
consumers’ reaction to the firm’s (non)responsible sourcing can influence these decisions.
Building on GLS, we bring a behavioral lens to the firm’s decision making and explore how
relevant behavioral biases affect the firm’s sourcing decision. Following the lead of Lee and
Tang (2018), who recommended applying a behavioral lens to the growing area of socially
and environmentally responsible operations, we develop a behavioral model of responsible
sourcing. We examine how this behavioral approach in modeling a firm’s sourcing strategy
can modify some of the insights derived from the classical model.
3.2.4 Behavioral Operations Management
Considerable research in behavioral operations management applies behavioral insights to
topics in operations and supply chain management. For example, many researchers have
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examined the behavioral biases in newsvendor decision making with the goal of developing
new models that can better explain human decision making and provide practical insights
(see, e.g., Schweitzer and Cachon 2000, Su 2008, Ho et al. 2010). We apply behavioral
insights to the same purpose, using concepts such as the diversification bias (Simonson
1990, Read and Loewenstein 1995, Benartzi and Thaler 2001) and the dual sourcing bias
(Gurnani et al. 2014) in the context of responsible sourcing. Our study extends the re-
cent stream of work in the behavioral operations management literature on firms’ sourcing
decisions (see, e.g., Gurnani et al. 2014, Goldschmidt et al. 2014, Csermely and Minner
2015, Kalkanci 2017). In contrast to the existing work, our study does not focus on supply
uncertainty, but explores the impact of market segmentation potential through responsible
sourcing on a firm’s sourcing decision.
3.3 Theory Development
An important objective of our study is to document and explain behavioral deviations from
the normative benchmark, which in our case corresponds to the model proposed by GLS.
We will first review this existing model, then make predictions based on it and finally
introduce behavioral forces that lead to deviations from these rational predictions.
3.3.1 Problem Setting
The problem setting is the same as that of GLS: A buyer needs to procure a product to
sell to consumers in a market. The buyer will sell the product at a fixed retail price (V )
to fulfill a constant demand (e.g., the market consists of 10, 000 customers each of whom
will buy only one product). The product is available from two different suppliers: one that
is socially responsible and abides by social and environmental obligations and another that
is not responsible and might violate these obligations with a known chance of φ. The pur-
chasing cost from the responsible supplier (CR) is higher than that from the nonresponsible
supplier (CNR < CR). Both suppliers will meet their purchase commitments; however, if
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a violation occurs on the suppliers’ side, it may cause the buyer to lose a portion of the
market. Specifically, a certain portion of the customers (i.e., θ of the 10, 000 customers) are
socially conscious, and are willing to pay r more for the product if it is sourced from the
responsible supplier. Meantime, α of these socially conscious customers will refuse to buy
the product if a violation occurs. Two cases can be assumed regarding unsold products:
the buyer can return the unsold products to the supplier and fully recover the purchase cost
(we refer to this case as ‘full salvage value’); the buyer can only realize a salvage value
less than the full purchase cost. If low enough, this salvage value can influence the buyer’s
sourcing decision (we refer to this case as ‘low salvage value’). The buyer’s objective is to
maximize expected profit by deciding how many products to procure from each supplier.
3.3.2 Normative Theory
As GLS demonstrate in their research, three factors determine the buyer’s sourcing strat-
egy: r, which influences the relative profitability of sourcing from the suppliers (i.e., CR −
CNR + r); θ, which determines the scale of how much revenue the buyer can obtain from
r; and α, which determines the scale of the consequences of sourcing from the nonrespon-
sible supplier. These three factors permit four possible sourcing policies (as Figure B1 in
Appendix B depicts): low cost (LC), i.e., sourcing from the nonresponsible supplier and
selling the same product to both customer segments at price V ; dual sourcing (DS), i.e.,
sourcing from both suppliers to sell different products to different customer segments at
prices V and V + r; responsible mass (RM), i.e., sourcing from the responsible supplier
and selling the same product to both customer segments at price V ; and responsible niche
(RN), i.e., sourcing from the responsible supplier and selling only to socially conscious
customers at price V + r. Table 3.1 summarizes the buyer’s profit under each of these
four possible sourcing policies.2 Based on the analysis by GLS, the buyer decides on her
sourcing policy by choosing the one that yields the highest profit. An improvement in re-
2In implementing the experiment, we use 10,000 for the number of customers, instead of normalizing the
customer volume to 1 as in GLS.
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sponsible sourcing is realized when the market reactions provide incentives for the buyer to
prefer a more responsible sourcing policy over a less responsible one. For example, if the
buyer prefers DS over LC (respectively, RM), an improvement (respectively, a deteriora-
tion) in responsible sourcing happens because this preference results in less (respectively,
more) sourcing from the nonresponsible supplier. It is noted here that since the buyer’s
preference between RM and RN does not influence nonresponsible sourcing, the main fo-
cus is on the buyer’s preference between LC, DS, and RM (nonetheless, all insights and
results of our study apply to the buyer’s preference between RM and RN as well). Using
the results from GLS, we structure the thresholds that lead to these preferences, both for
the full salvage value case (Table 3.1)3 and for the case of a low salvage value (Table 3.2)4:
Table 3.1: The buyer’s profit with four possible sourcing policies.




CNR) (respectively, (CR − CNR) > φ
α
10, 000
V in the case of low salvage value), and RM
dominates LC otherwise.5
Lemma 1 indicates that the benefit of pursuing LC instead of RM lies in savings in the
procurement cost by 10, 000(CR − CNR). The downside of LC compared with RM is the
possible market loss by φα(V −CNR) (respectively, φαV in the case of low salvage value).
3Because it adds no special insight into the problem, we ignore the fixed cost that the buyer incurs in GLS.
4For simplicity, Table 3.2 considers a zero salvage value as the low salvage value in GLS. All results and
conclusions hold with all positive salvage values less than or equal to the salvage value in GLS that creates a
preference for LC over DS.
5Note that the condition outlined in Lemma 1 depends on the total number of customers, since α represents
the number of customers with boycotting behavior. In GLS, α represents the percentage of such customers.
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Table 3.2: The buyer’s profit with four possible sourcing policies in the case of salvage
value = 0.
Thus, the relative attractiveness of LC compared with RM is determined by the strength of
these two conflicting factors. Building on Lemma 1, we now derive the thresholds of the
preferences between LC/RM and DS.
LEMMA 2. The buyer prefers LC over DS when (θ − φα)(CR − CNR − r) > 0
(respectively, θ(CR − CNR)− (θ − φα)r > 0 in the case of low salvage value).
The intuition behind Lemma 2 is straightforward. Because the buyer is already sourc-
ing from the nonresponsible supplier—the possibility of losing a portion of the market is
already accepted—a decision on dual sourcing depends only on the profitability of market
segmentation, which is determined by the sign of (θ − φα)(CR − CNR − r) (respectively,
θ(CR − CNR)− (θ − φα)r in the case of low salvage value).
LEMMA 2. The buyer prefers RM over DS when φα(V −CNR)−10, 000(CR−CNR)+
(θ−φα)(CR−CNR− r) > 0 (respectively, φαV − 10, 000(CR−CNR) + θ(CR−CNR)−
(θ − φα)r > 0 in the case of low salvage value).
The first two terms in Lemma 3’s expression represent the necessary condition for the
dominance of RM to LC, and we know from Lemma 1 that these two terms should be
positive so that the buyer prefers RM. Hence, this expression implies that preferring RM
over DS is the same as first preferring RM over LC and then keeping this preference over
DS as well. If the scale of extra benefit in market segmentation, i.e., (θ − φα)(r − (CR −
CNR)) (respectively, (θ − φα)r − θ(CR − CNR) in the case of low salvage value), is not
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large enough to cover the cost of possible market loss, the buyer will not prefer market
segmentation and thus DS over RM.
Based on Lemmas 1-2, as GLS show, although large values of r and θ (the param-
eters that capture the encouraging reaction) in general favor responsible sourcing, such
consumer reactions may also backfire and decrease the buyer’s responsible sourcing when
the encouraging reaction is strong enough to make DS more profitable than RM for the
buyer. On the other hand, a high α (the parameter representing the discouraging consumer
reaction) reduces nonresponsible sourcing more generally and thus improves responsible
sourcing. However, for situations in which the buyer faces a low salvage value for unsold
products (e.g., zero refund of the procurement cost as opposed to the full refund), while the
effect of the encouraging reaction remains the same as without such costs, the discouraging
reaction may now also backfire. As Lemma 2 shows, the counter effect of the discouraging
reaction on responsible sourcing happens when the salvage value is low so that an increase
in the discouraging reaction makes LC more profitable than DS for the buyer (since LC
avoids high procurement costs in the excess inventory of unsold products).
The insights above do not allow us to come up with a straightforward answer to our
main research question. We summarize these insights in three points as follows. (1) For
low levels of the encouraging consumer reaction, this socially conscious reaction does not
affect responsible sourcing in the supply chain because it cannot lead to a preference for DS
over LC (or a preference for RM over DS). (2) For high levels of the encouraging reaction,
this reaction can increase the tendency for responsible sourcing in the presence of a low
discouraging reaction in the market by leading to a preference for DS over LC. However,
the same levels of this reaction can lead to less responsible sourcing in the presence of a
medium-to-high discouraging reaction because it will lead to a preference for DS over RM.
(3) In the case of a low salvage value, increasing the discouraging reaction leads to less
responsible sourcing because decision makers will prefer LC over DS.
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3.3.3 Behavioral Theory
Lemmas 1-3 establish which sourcing strategy a rational decision maker prefers. To exam-
ine this decision from a behavioral perspective, we reformulate the GLS model by incor-
porating behavioral biases into the buyer’s sourcing decision. Given the abundant evidence
on dual sourcing in the context of responsible sourcing, the core of our behavioral model is
to account for the buyer’s tendency for dual sourcing due to the potential market segmenta-
tion that the presence of the encouraging consumer reaction induces. In other words, when
facing two distinct customer segments in the market (i.e., socially conscious customers and
regular customers), the buyer will be more likely to go with different suppliers for these
different segments to create diversification and variety in its supplies and products.
Dual-sourcing bias has been previously studied in firms’ sourcing decisions in supply
chains. For example, Gurnani et al. (2014) found a tendency for dual sourcing in a buyer’s
sourcing decision that faced one reliable supplier and one unreliable supplier, even though
single sourcing was the optimal policy. They explained this behavior using the diversi-
fication bias and variety-seeking behavior (Simonson 1990, Read and Loewenstein 1995,
Benartzi and Thaler 2001). Variety seeking behavior occurs when people tend to choose
more variety in combined choices of quantities of goods (here, procuring multiple prod-
ucts) than in sequential choices (here, procuring one product each time). Diversification
bias extends this behavior to contexts other than consumption, for example, asset-allocation
between investment options with uncertain returns, and further proposes that people diver-
sify their choices evenly across possible options. Gurnani et al. (2014) see the root of the
dual-sourcing bias they describe in these behavioral biases.
In our context, where different consumer segments can also be a source of diversifi-
cation, we further relate the dual-sourcing bias to partition-dependence decision making
(Fox and Clemen 2005, Fox et al. 2005). With partition-dependence decision making, var-
ious groupings of available options lead investment decisions towards diversification. Such
diversifications exist even when hedging against uncertainty in an investment portfolio is
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irrelevant (Fox et al. 2005). We postulate that the market segmentation potential, which
originates in an encouraging consumer reaction, leads to a diversification and dual-sourcing
bias in our context. Without this possible market segmentation, the buyer will not exhibit a
diversification bias as there is no supply uncertainty to hedge against. To formulate and in-
corporate this behavioral bias into the buyer’s decision making, we characterize the amount
of product sourced from either supplier in the presence of the encouraging reaction in the
market as follows:
QN = (10, 000− θ)β[1R+(A)]θ − β[1R+(B)](10, 000− θ) (1a)
QR = θ − β[1R+(A)]θ + β[1R+(B)](10, 000− θ) (1b)
QN and QR represent sourcing quantities from the nonresponsible and responsible sup-
pliers. The first terms on the right-hand side of Equations (1a)-(1b) are sourcing quantities
related to the market segmentation, i.e., sourcing from the nonresponsible supplier to serve
regular customers and sourcing from the responsible supplier to serve the socially con-
scious segment. The 1R+(x) is an indicator function (i.e., 1R+(x) = 1 if x ∈ R+, and
1R+(x) = 0 otherwise), and A and B are the expressions outlined in Lemma 2 and Lemma
3, respectively. Hence, the indicator functions with A and B allow deviating from the dual-
sourcing strategy toward less responsible sourcing (if 1R+(A) = 1 and 1R+(B) = 0) or
toward more responsible sourcing (if 1R+(B) = 1 and 1R+(A) = 0) by replacing one sup-
plier with another. The behavioral parameter β < 1 prevents these deviations from fully
realizing, and thus represents the tendency of the buyer to focus on dual sourcing. With
β = 1, there is no dual-sourcing bias and Equations (1a)-(1b) simplify to the outcome de-
scribed by the classical model. With β < 1, the buyer will have a bias toward dual sourcing
and will discount value that favors deviating from it. For instance, a β = 0.2 means that a
dual-sourcing policy is five times as important for the buyer as any rational deviation from
it.
In the absence of an encouraging reaction, where there is no market need for dual
sourcing, Equations (1a)-(1b) will take the form of
53
QN = 10, 000 + β[1R+(−A)]0− β[1R+(−B)]10, 000 (2a)
QR = 0− β[1R+(−A)]0 + β[1R+(−B)]10, 000 (2b)
when LC dominates RM (based on Lemma 1, and they will the form of
QN = 0 + β[1R+(−A)]10, 000− β[1R+(−B)]0 (3a)
QR = 10, 000− β[1R+(−A)]10, 000 + β[1R+(−B)]0 (3b)
otherwise. The expressions A and B are the same as in Equations (1a)-(1b) originating
from Lemma 2 and 3, respectively. Hence, the indicator functions with −A and −B allow
deviating from single sourcing toward dual sourcing. A β < 1 here has a similar meaning
to that in Equations (1a)-(1b) in the sense that the buyer is reluctant to deviate from LC
(or RM). These allow us to keep a consistent structure for our reformulation. However, we
expect a stronger bias (i.e., a lower β) in the presence of an encouraging reaction, because
of the market segmentation potential created by such a consumer reaction.
In addition to the dual-sourcing bias, and in order to empirically compare our behavioral
model with the classical model in the experimental study in Section 3.4, we also consider
an error term for human decision making. This error term allows for deviations from the
optimal order quantities due to random error in decision making (Ho et al. 2010). We
capture this error through the indicator function. We assume that the indicator function
1R+(x) will take the value of 0 + ∆ when 1R+(x) = 0, and 1−∆ when 1R+(x) = 1, where
0 < ∆ < 1 is the random error term. To systematically capture this error, we relate it
to how the presence and absence of the encouraging reaction changes the dynamics of the
effect of α. In the absence of the encouraging reaction (i.e., when r = 0 and θ = α), the
buyer loses α customers out of the total 10,000 customers if the nonresponsible supplier is
the source and a violation occurs. On the other hand, in the presence of the encouraging
reaction (i.e., when there are customers with r > 0 and θ represents this customer segment,
among whom α customers are willing to boycott as well), the buyer will lose α customers
out of the θ customers. Hence, although the magnitude of the possible market loss remains
the same, the presence of the encouraging reaction makes it seem proportionally bigger.
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These error terms keep 0 < ∆ < 1.
Without behavioral parameters, i.e., when β = 1 and ∆ = 0, the behavioral model
is equivalent to the classical model. In this case, there is no dual-sourcing bias in the
buyer’s sourcing decision and the buyer’s sourcing policy is rational with no error in the
optimal sourcing quantities. Hence, we cannot expect any behavioral influences from the
encouraging consumer reaction. With behavioral parameters, the behavioral model changes
the classical model’s predictions as we outline in the following two propositions. The key
difference between the behavioral and the classical model, originating from the behavioral
parameters, is to make the buyer prefer dual sourcing in the presence of the encouraging
reaction.
PROPOSITION 1. The presence of an encouraging reaction by consumers, regardless
of magnitude, is always (never) helpful with responsible sourcing when the discouraging
reaction is weak (strong).
The intuition behind Proposition 1 lies in the fact that the presence of the encouraging
reaction (through even small amounts of extra willingness-to-pay) in the market induces a
clear market segmentation for the buyer and leads its sourcing policy toward dual sourcing.
When the discouraging reaction in the market is weak, this dual-sourcing bias is helpful
with responsible sourcing as it avoids the buyer’s low-cost sourcing (i.e., sourcing solely
from the nonresponsible supplier). On the other hand, when the discouraging reaction is
6In the interest of simplicity in the parameter estimation procedure, we do not consider different ε’s for
each participant. Thus, the error term here reflects a uniform error in human decision making.
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strong, the dual-sourcing bias does not help with responsible sourcing as it impedes the
buyer’s responsible-mass sourcing (i.e., sourcing solely from the responsible supplier).7
Our behavioral model, therefore, modifies the classical model’s prediction by relating the
effect of the encouraging reaction on responsible sourcing to its presence independent of
its magnitude. When the encouraging reaction in the market is high enough so that the
classical model predicts dual sourcing, the behavioral model and the classical model are
in agreement on the effect of the encouraging reaction on responsible sourcing, though
through different dynamics. Therefore, Proposition 1 modifies the first two points summa-
rized earlier, showing that the encouraging reaction is always (never) helpful with respon-
sible sourcing when the discouraging reaction in the market is weak (strong).
PROPOSITION 2. The discouraging reaction is always helpful with responsible sourc-
ing irrespective of the product’s salvage value.
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is similar to that of Proposition 1. The presence of
the encouraging reaction in the market creates a dual-sourcing bias in the buyer’s sourcing
decision that prevents a detrimental preference for LC over DS—a preference which the
classical model predicts when the product’s salvage value is low. Hence, the behavioral
model modifies the prediction of the classical model and establishes that the discouraging
reaction cannot be detrimental to responsible sourcing in the case of a low salvage value
(even with salvage value=0). For all other cases, i.e., medium-to-full salvage values, the
behavioral model is in agreement with the classical model, and both favor the positive effect
of the discouraging reaction on responsible sourcing. Therefore, Proposition 2 modifies
the third point summarized earlier by showing that the discouraging reaction can never be
detrimental to responsible sourcing, even if the product salvage value is low.
Propositions 1 and 2 together help us reach to a straightforward answer to our main
research question: An encouraging reaction (by even just a small extra willingness-to-pay)
leads to more responsible sourcing for hard-to-substitute products (i.e., for products where
7A weak (strong) discouraging reaction refers to all levels of this reaction lower (higher) than or equal to
the ‘low’ (‘high’) value in GLS that creates a preference for LC over RM (and vice versa).
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discouraging reactions are most likely low). However, an encouraging reaction will lead to
less responsible sourcing for products that are easily substitutable (i.e., for products where
discouraging reactions are potentially high). Regardless of product type, creating a discour-
aging reaction among customers always increases responsible sourcing, although it may be
easier to accomplish such a consumer response for products with numerous substitutes.
Therefore, in supply chains of products with no (many) substitutes, the encouraging (dis-
couraging) reaction is the most effective consumer reaction to support responsible sourcing
in the supply chain.
3.4 Behavioral Experiment
In this section, we use data from a behavioral experiment to validate our proposed behav-
ioral model by comparing its predictions with those of the classical model. This comparison
is centered on the three insights from the GLS model outlined earlier, where predictions
from our behavioral model differ from GLS leading to Propositions 1 and 2. Hence, by
comparing our behavioral model to the rational decision-making model, we also validate
those propositions: Is there a transition point at which the presence of the encouraging re-
action becomes helpful with (detrimental to) responsible sourcing when the discouraging
reaction is low (high)? And can the discouraging reaction be detrimental to responsible
sourcing when the salvage value is low?
Table 3.3 outlines our experimental design. To have a solid comparison, we first cre-
ate control groups in which the behavioral and classical models predict the same sourcing
policy. Then we create treatment groups by manipulating the model parameters so that
they result in conditions in which the classical and behavioral models lead to different pre-
dictions. In the first two scenarios, we test the behavioral effects of the presence of the
encouraging reaction in accordance with Propositions 1. The control groups in these sce-
narios simply remove the encouraging reaction altogether so that the behavioral model and
the classical model have the same predictions. The treatment groups add the encouraging
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reaction, but keep this parameter at values much below the level with which GLS will not
predict dual sourcing, so that the different predictions from the behavioral and classical
models are due to the mere presence of the encouraging reaction. In the third scenario
(that tests the detrimental effect of increasing the discouraging reaction in the case of low
salvage value), the control group keeps the discouraging reaction low enough for the behav-
ioral and classical models to predict the same. The treatment group shifts the discouraging
reaction up to a level much higher than what GLS need to predict LC in the case of low
salvage value, which leads to different predictions from the two models in accordance with
Proposition 2. In all scenarios, all other parameters remain the same for both treatment and
control groups.
Table 3.3: Experimental groups.
Because participants in each group will repeat the same task for several rounds, we
draw randomly chosen parameter values from ranges of values for each parameter so that
the participants repeat the task with different parameter values in each round. Therefore,
in each scenario, the parameters have ranges, and these ranges change between the control
and treatment groups according to the logic outlined above (Table B1 in Appendix B shows
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the ranges of all parameters used in the experiment).
3.4.1 Experimental Procedure
We recruited 219 participants via Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT)8 to perform the role of
buyers. Participants received a flat $0.01 participation payment and a performance-based
payment based on the total profit each participant made in the experiment. The experi-
ment was coded on the SoPHIE platform (Hendriks 2012). The computer played the roles
of suppliers and customers. We used payment adjustments so that the performance-based
payments fell into comparable ranges for all experimental groups (see Table B1 in Ap-
pendix B). Average payment was $2.50 (STD=0.739), with a $0.02 minimum and a $3.91
maximum payment. Of the participants, 50.2% were male, 49.3% were female, and one
participant preferred not to indicate their gender. The average age was 37.6 (STD=11.04).
The average income was between $25,000 and $50,000. Most participants had some col-
lege education: 37.4% had some college credits, and 41.1% reported having earned a bach-
elor’s degree.
Upon accepting to participate in the experiment, participants were randomly assigned
to one of the six experimental groups (as in Table 3.3). Before starting the experimental
task, participants were asked to watch an instructional video and were told that doing so
was necessary to perform well and obtain profits in the task. They were also told that they
would repeat the experimental task for 20 rounds and would be paid based on the total
profit they made in all rounds. The instructional video narrated the descriptions for the
participants and lasted 100-120sec, depending on the experimental group (full descriptions
of the experimental tasks are available in Appendix B). We closely monitored whether the
participants were going through the instructional video. In the recruitment process, 21
participants dropped out at the instructional video, and 15 participants went to the experi-
mental task without finishing the instructional video. These participants dropped out after
8Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) is a popular avenue for subject recruitment, and several studies have
endorsed AMT as a reliable source of experimental data (see Lee et al. 2018 and references therein).
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a couple of rounds, and thus were not included in the final pool. Table 3.4 shows the final
number of participants in each experimental group. We note that 97.3% of the participants
agreed/strongly-agreed that the description and the video instruction were clear. In addi-
tion, at the end of the experiment, participants were asked to indicate if any part of the
description was unclear or confusing to them. 95% of the participants found none of the
parts confusing. Inclusion/exclusion of the other participants (2.7% and 5%) in the analy-
ses did not make any difference in the results. Participants observed the same description of
the task in each round with different parameter values randomly drawn from the parameter
value intervals discussed earlier.
Table 3.4: Number of participants.
In each round, participants determined their sourcing decisions, i.e., sourcing quantities
from the responsible and nonresponsible suppliers. They were shown the profit they made
with that sourcing decision (according to the profit formulations in Tables 3.1 and 3.2) along
with the total profit they had made so far. They then continued with the next round. Upon
completion of all 20 rounds, participants were shown the dollar value of their earnings,9 and
they finished the experiment by answering questions on the clarity of the task (as mentioned
above) and supplying the demographic information. All results were independent of the
9Note that we compensate participants based on the expected profits resulting from their decisions; we do
not implement a random draw that determines whether a violation occurs or not in the experiment.
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participants’ demographics, such as gender and age.
3.4.2 Preliminary Results
Table 3.5 shows preliminary results for all experimental groups. Because our problem
setting did not incorporate supply uncertainty, we did not expect to see any oversourcing
(Gurnani et al. 2014, Kalkanci 2017). In line with this expectation, neither the mean nor
the median of total order (QN+QR) differs statistically from the total demand (i.e., 10,000)
in any of the groups. We calculate the average order quantity for each participant and
use t-tests and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, respectively, for equality of observed means and
medians with predicted values. As one can see in Table 3.5, the classical model of GLS fails
to predict the observed sourcing policy in terms of order quantities. The only exception is
the case when DS is the optimal policy, and thus the classical model and the behavioral
model largely coincide in their prediction.
In addition to the order quantities, we also study the ratio
QR
QN+QR
as a measure of
diversification (Gurnani et al. 2014). As Gurnani et al. (2014) discuss, with optimal single-
sourcing, the theoretical value of this measure is either zero or one, and hence, an observed
value close to 0.5 indicates a diversification bias. As seen in Table 3.5, the presence of the
encouraging reaction in our treatment groups pushes this measure closer to 0.5. Without
the encouraging reaction, this measure is closer to 1 and 0; this was expected because there
was no supply uncertainty in our setting to cause the kind of diversification bias reported
by Gurnani et al. (2014).
Another important observation lies in the overall tendency of change in the amount of
nonresponsible sourcing (QN) between the control and treatment groups in each scenario.
As seen in Figure 3.1, these changes are far from the classical model’s predictions and are
in line with the behavioral model’s predictions.
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Table 3.5: Observed order quantities and predictions of the classical model.
Figure 3.1: Nonresponsibly sourced products—observed versus predicted by the classical
model. Note: Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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3.4.3 Behavioral Predictions
Having established that the classical model of GLS does not fit the experimental data well,
we now examine whether the behavioral model can fit with the observed results in Table 5
and Figure 1. We do so by using statistical methods to estimate the behavioral parameters
of the model. We follow the approach of Ho et al. (2010) and use maximum likelihood es-
timation assuming each participant’s order quantities follow a normal distribution with the
behavioral model’s prediction as the structural mean. Thus, the objective is to estimate the
unknown parameters of the behavioral model through estimating the structural mean. Simi-
lar to the approach of Ho et al. (2010), the parameters are specified to be common across all
experimental groups while the mean structure changes for each group according to Equa-
tions (1a)-(3b). That is, we consider uniform values for the behavioral parameters across
all groups. This keeps the focus on examining whether the extended behavioral model is
more powerful than the existing rational model in terms of predicting larger ranges of data
rather than on finding the best fit and parameter values for each group (Rabin 2013a,b).
Because our setting contains two decision variables from participants, i.e., QN and
QR, we use a bivariate normal distribution to simultaneously estimate the means of both
variables. This ensures that our estimation procedure takes into account variations in both
extracted variables. Based on our discussion in Section 3.3.3, we define the full model
here as one with different β’s depending on whether the encouraging consumer reaction is
present or not. Each of these β’s remains the same across all scenarios and groups. Also,
we consider one ε for all scenarios and groups to retain consistency in error terms across
all experimental groups.
Table 3.6 shows the results of the estimation. For the estimated β’s (βenc and βno enc
are the estimated values in the presence and the absence of the encouraging reaction, re-
spectively), we use a t-test to test if they differ statistically from 1. The standard errors are
clustered at the subject level to account for within-subject correlation in ordering decisions
(Ho et al. 2010). We cannot perform a t-test for ε because there is no null-value for this
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parameter (the classical model removes the whole error term ∆ rather than setting its ε to a
null-value). We thus use a likelihood ratio test to statistically test its effect in the model.10
The second column of Table 3.6 shows the estimated parameters, β and ε. As seen, βenc
is significantly less than βno enc, which means the dual-sourcing bias in the presence of the
encouraging reaction is significantly stronger than that in the absence of such a consumer
reaction. The third and fourth columns test the effect of the two behavioral parameters (β
and ε) in the model by using a likelihood ratio test. Both parameters improve the model fit
at the 0.001 significance level (note that when the error term is removed from the model,
the first β loses its effect in Equations (2a)-(3b), and its estimated value remains at an ini-
tial value). The last column repeats the same analysis for the fully reduced form of the
behavioral model, which is in fact the classical model.
The estimation results here show that the behavioral model statistically outperforms
the classical model and that both behavioral parameters are essential in obtaining better
predictions. Next, we check if the behavioral model, with the estimated uniform values for
the behavioral parameters, can consistently explain the observed data (in 95% confidence
intervals) in all scenarios and groups. Table 3.7 shows the predictions of the behavioral
model. The behavioral model provides consistent predictions (in 95% confidence intervals)
for all scenarios and groups. Furthermore, as Figure 3.2 depicts, the behavioral model fits
the observed nonresponsible sourcing quantities across different scenarios and groups very
well.
3.4.4 Robustness Checks
We conducted robustness checks to examine whether (a) a uniform dual-sourcing bias and
(b) a naı̈ve diversification (Benartzi and Thaler 2001) can also explain the observed data.
We also further examine whether the presence of an encouraging consumer reaction in fact
10Likewise, we cannot perform a Wald test for ε because of the lack of a null-value for the parameter. To
be consistent, we use a likelihood ratio test for β as well. However, we check a Wald test for β to ensure that
the dependence of observations from the same participant in the data does not change the concluded results,
and the outcome is in line with the likelihood ratio test (same as in Ho et al. 2010 and Kalkanci 2017).
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Table 3.6: Parameter estimation of the behavioral model.
Table 3.7: Observed order quantities and predictions of the behavioral model.
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Figure 3.2: Nonresponsibly sourced products—observed versus predicted by the classical
and behavioral models. Note: Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
induces a dual-sourcing bias.
For the first robustness check, we repeat our parameter estimation considering a uni-
form β instead of the split βenc and βno enc. For the second robustness check, we repeat the
estimation assuming that the buyer pursues a half-half dual-sourcing policy due to having
two options (i.e., suppliers) to source the product from. This naı̈ve diversification ignores
the role of the market segmentation induced by an encouraging consumer reaction and only
looks at the diversification from the biases on the supply side, similar to the diversification
bias discussed by Gurnani et al. (2014) for dual sourcing in their problem. Finally, for a
third robustness check, we repeat our estimation without assuming that the presence of an
encouraging consumer reaction induces a dual-sourcing bias. That is, we assume that the
buyer’s sourcing decision follows Equations (1a)-(1b) only when dual sourcing is the clas-
sical optimal, and otherwise it is Equations (2a)-(2b) and (3a)-(3b) that define the buyer’s
sourcing decision.
Table 3.8 presents the results of our robustness checks. The third column shows that
the model with a uniform β does not work as well as the full model with different β’s in
covering the salience of the dual-sourcing bias in the presence of the encouraging reaction
(and the market segmentation induced by that). The fourth column shows the result of the
estimation using the naı̈ve diversification model explained above. Comparing the outcome
of this estimation with that of the full behavioral model (presented in the second column),
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we find that the naı̈ve diversification is not able to explain the observed data better than the
model that relates the dual-sourcing bias to the market segmentation. We use the Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) for this comparison because the two models contain the same
parameters while changing the structure of the model. The relative likelihood of the naı̈ve
diversification model against the full model, calculated by e(AIC0−AICmodel)/2 (Burnham
and Anderson 2004), shows that this model is 9.85 × 10−34 as probable as the full model
to minimize the information loss in the maximum likelihood estimation.
Table 3.8: Robustness checks on the nonuniformity of the dual-sourcing bias and the mar-
ket induced dual-sourcing.
The last column shows the result of the estimation that ignores any dual-sourcing in-
duced by the presence of the encouraging reaction unless it is the classical optimal policy
(note that here βenc is for when there is an encouraging reaction and dual sourcing is the
classical optimal policy, and βno enc is for the otherwise). We use a similar comparison
(using the AIC) here and find that this model is not as powerful as our behavioral model
in explaining the observed data (the model is 3.86 × 10−97 as probable as the full behav-
ioral model to minimize the information loss in the maximum likelihood estimation). It is
also worth noting that, in contrast to what we obtain by our full behavioral model in Table
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3.7 (i.e., nonsignificant differences between the predicted and observed values), none of
the alternative models tried here or presented in Table 3.6 could provide such consistent
predictions (in 95% confidence intervals) for all scenarios and groups.
The result of the estimation for the last robustness check above uncovers a meaningful
insight. When the dual-sourcing is the (classical) optimal policy, it seems to be stronger
than the dual-sourcing that is based on the presence of the encouraging reaction regardless
of it being the classical optimal policy or not (0.26 compared with 0.31). Therefore, as
another robustness check, we further look at more classifications for the parameter β. In our
model, we have tied its value to the presence and absence of the encouraging reaction (and
the market segmentation induced by that). Here, we tie its value to how likely the induced
market segmentation is to occur. In other words, the magnitude of the extra willingness-to-
pay r can determine how valuable the market segmentation by θ and (10, 000−θ) is for the
buyer, and thus can implicitly determine the weight of the dual-sourcing bias for the buyer.
The best way to consider the magnitude of r is through its magnitude relative to CR −
CNR because it determines the value of r. In our experimental setting, in the interest of
keeping the classical optimal policies unchanged between the control and treatment groups,
we have r < CR−CNR for when LC is the classical optimal, r close to CR−CNR for when
RM is the classical optimal, and r > CR −CNR for when DS is the classical optimal. This
can expand our previous classification for β as follows: β in the absence of the encouraging
reaction, β in the presence of the encouraging reaction and when LC is the classical optimal,
β in the presence of the encouraging reaction and when RM is the classical optimal, and β
in the presence of the encouraging reaction and when DS is the classical optimal. Hence,
we repeat our parameter estimation using four β’s reflecting these four cases. Table 3.9
shows the result of this robustness check. As seen, the values of β’s correspond to the
relative magnitudes of r. Nonetheless, the likelihood ratio test is only barely significant. A
Wald test also shows nonsignificant differences compared to the full model. The result of
this robustness check shows that no further classification of the parameter β is necessary
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for the behavioral model to explain the observed data.
Table 3.9: Robustness check on the classification of the parameter β.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we developed a behavioral model of a firm’s responsible sourcing to inves-
tigate the effect of a market’s socially responsible reactions to firms’ sourcing decisions.
Building on the stylized model and framework of GLS, our problem setting included a
“buyer” (i.e., the manufacturer), a “responsible supplier,” and a “nonresponsible supplier,”
and focused on two socially responsible reactions: customers’ extra willingness-to-pay for
responsibly sourced products (as an encouraging reaction) and their willingness-to-boycott
the buyer in the event of a social/environmental violation on its suppliers’ side (as a discour-
aging reaction). The core of our behavioral model, which was validated via an experimental
study, was to incorporate an important behavioral consideration: In the presence of an en-
couraging reaction by consumers, the buyer has a tendency for dual-sourcing bias due to
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the perceived potential for market segmentation. Our behavioral reformulation, incorporat-
ing this behavioral bias into the classical formulation, modified some of the predictions of
the classical model and lead to very different predictions of the buyer’s sourcing decisions.
With these modifications, our analyses show that: (1) the encouraging reaction, regard-
less of its magnitude, is always (never) helpful with responsible sourcing when the discour-
aging reaction is (not) sufficiently prevalent in the market, (2) the discouraging reaction is
always helpful with responsible sourcing regardless of the product’s salvage value. We
obtained these findings by investigating scenarios in which the classical model yields in-
consistent predictions regarding the effect of the two socially responsible reactions. These
findings enable us to reach to a more consistent and straightforward answer to the main
question in this context (i.e., which type of consumer reaction is more effective in im-
proving responsible sourcing by firms in different supply chains and industries?): (1) in
supply chains of products that do not have perfect substitutes, the creation and expansion
of an encouraging reaction among customers is always sound policy, (2) in supply chains
of products with many substitutes in which an encouraging reaction is not helpful with re-
sponsible sourcing, promoting and enlarging a discouraging reaction among customers is
preferable, and (3) enhancing a discouraging reaction in the market is always good practice,
irrespective of the supply chain type, although doing so may be easier in supply chains of
products with many substitutes.
These recommendations are meaningful for practice and are in line with what we can
expect from customers if we consider the nature of the products. For products that have
several substitutes in the market, it is unrealistic to expect higher willingness-to-pays from
customers for a product they can buy from other manufacturers. Therefore, promoting a
discouraging reaction among customers becomes the priority. On the other hand, for prod-
ucts without perfect substitutes, it is realistically possible to sell them at higher prices by
promoting their responsibly sourced attributes, a situation that gives an encouraging reac-
tion powerful leverage. Meanwhile, although a discouraging reaction can also be helpful
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here, it may not be easily achievable because customers lack other options. Thus, our
behavioral model yields recommendations that can be implemented by NGOs trying to
promote proper socially responsible behavior among customers in different supply chains
to improve firms’ responsible sourcing.
Finally, given some level of similarity between the problem of our context and that of
firms’ sourcing from an unreliable (i.e., disruption prone) and a reliable supplier, our results
can also have implications for manufacturers’ management of their supply uncertainty. A
discouraging reaction, when realized, has an indirect impact on the supply side by deter-
mining how many products a manufacturer can sell in the market. This can be similar to a
supply uncertainty that also determines manufacturers’ potential sales. Our findings show
that responsible sourcing can be a viable way to manage indirect supply uncertainty, in line
with other supply-risk mitigation efforts, such as dual sourcing and process improvement
(Wang et al. 2010). However, our analyses highlight when and how this supply-risk mit-
igation can be pursued by structuring supply chains for socially responsible behavior. A
discouraging reaction, although recommended for any supply chain, is very likely to take
effect only in supply chains of products with many substitutes. Therefore, manufacturers




CHARGING FOR RECYCLING AND CONSUMER ADOPTION OF GREEN
ELECTRONICS
4.1 Introduction
Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE), also called e-waste, is a complex and
fast-growing waste stream. Worldwide, e-waste is growing at an annual rate of 4-5% (Balde
et al. 2015). Of the various options for managing e-waste, recycling has proven to yield
the most environmental benefits (Demeester et al. 2013). The inherent complexity of e-
waste recycling, however, has been a burden to recycling operations and a discouraging
factor to practitioners: “There is almost nothing as hard to recycle as electronics” (Securis
2017). Meanwhile, regulators and legislators in a majority of countries have mandated that
manufacturers collect WEEEs from their customers free of charge. While such policies
have led to noticeable growth in recycling rates in some industries (e.g., steel and ferrous
recycling), they have not done the same in others (e.g., plastic and glass recycling). In
these industries, where recycling costs are relatively higher, recycling rates remain low
(Demeester et al. 2013, US EPA 2016). The high costs of recycling core materials have
kept the recycling of e-waste far below an ideal point (Balde et al. 2015). This raises
a debate as to whether policies and environmental laws that insist on free recycling are
effective in increasing e-waste recycling rates over policies that would allow charging for
recycling to assist recycling systems with operational costs.
The first state in the U.S. to pass an e-waste recycling law was California in 2003.
Since then, 25 states have passed e-waste recycling legislation.1 All states except Califor-
nia and Utah use the Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) approach, whereby man-
1http://www.electronicstakeback.com/promote-good-laws/state-legislation/
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ufacturers take financial responsibility for recycling their old products. Utah’s law does
not require collection and only focuses on recycling education. California’s Electronic
Waste Recycling Act of 2003 charges customers a small recycling fee, similar to a tax, on
each purchase.2 Recently, Best Buy implemented a recycling program that charges $25
for accepting TVs/monitors for recycling. The new recycling program is implemented in
all states except Illinois and Pennsylvania, where state laws bar retailers from charging
for recycling (Best Buy has shut down its recycling program in these states). Each of
these policies—free recycling, recycling tax,3 and charging for recycling—has its own ad-
vantages and drawbacks. From the point of assisting with operational costs, charging for
recycling can directly help manufacturers and recyclers manage their recycling costs based
on their needs and can thus improve recycling rates of collected e-waste. Meanwhile, free
recycling (and a recycling tax policy, for that matter) hopes to keep the volume of product
return at higher levels because charging can deter customers from returning their products
for recycling. Although many states in the U.S. have enacted bans on landfilling and/or in-
cinerating some types of e-waste (such as TVs, monitors, desktops, laptops, and tablets),4
which limits households’ options in disposing of their used electronics, the main rationale
in a free recycling policy is to keep the product return a convenient option for customers.
From this point of view, Best Buy’s new charging-for-recycling program is a counterin-
tuitive policy that does not keep the same priority and focus on increasing the volume of
e-waste return. While the above debate is an obvious one, how charging for recycling can
potentially impact the efficiency of e-waste recycling in a bigger picture is worth uncover-
ing.
In this paper, we look at the potential benefits of charging for recycling beyond helping
with the operational costs. Specifically, we explore whether charging for recycling, com-
2https://www.calrecycle.ca.gov/electronics/retailer
3Although with California’s Electronic Waste Recycling Act retailers are required to remit the collected
fee to the California Department of Tax and Fee Administration, the fee is posed as a recycling fee, rather
than a tax, at the purchase. Nonetheless, we refer to this policy as a recycling tax policy in the interest of
making a better distinction from the charging-for-recycling program.
4http://www.electronicstakeback.com/wp-content/uploads/Disposal Ban Bills.pdf
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pared with free recycling and recycling tax policies, can result in higher consumer adoption
of recyclable electronics. Recently, there have been serious efforts to decrease the recycling
costs of e-waste through improving the recyclability of consumer electronics (for example,
EPEAT certification, which emphasizes recyclability aspects) and encouraging retailers to
market and sell more recyclable and greener electronics (for example, Energy Star Part-
ner of the Year recognition for retailers by the EPA in the U.S.).5 However, evidence has
shown that direct green marketing to increase consumer adoption of green products has not
been successful (see, e.g., Allcott and Taubinsky 2015, Allcott and Sweeney 2017). Hence,
retailers usually do not find investing in green marketing financially attractive (Deutsch
2010a, Deutsch 2010b, Allcott and Sweeney 2017).
We postulate that Best Buy’s charging-for-recycling program can be a viable alternative
that could potentially increase consumer adoption of green (recyclable)6 electronics by
indirectly nudging their attention towards the fact that recycling is costly, and thus making
recyclability a valuable attribute, and by improving their perceived self-efficacy to take
this eco-friendly action. Indirect resonation of “recyclability is valuable” by “recycling is
costly” at the purchase point lies in the concept of green nudges (Sunstein 2009), which
aims to enhance people’s intentions toward environmentally friendly actions. With the long
standing practice of free recycling, “recycling is costly” may never effectively resonate with
consumers at the purchase point, despite the growing concerns about high recycling costs
among recyclers (Demeester et al. 2013, Securis 2017). This sort of recycling charge, in
addition, can provide customers a proxy for the consequences of not buying a recyclable
product and thus improve their self-efficacy in taking an environmental action on their side,
lack of which has been proven to be a hindrance to consumers’ green purchases (see, e.g.,
Ellen et al. 1991, Berger and Corbin 1992, Rice et al. 1996).
To gain insights into this aspect of Best Buy’s new program, through controlled experi-
5https://www.epeat.net/resources/criteria-2/ and https://www.energystar.gov/about/awards
6In general, the criteria of “green” products focuses on three main aspects: products being free of toxic
compounds, being energy efficient, and being made of recyclable and renewable materials (Speer 2012).
Here, our focus is on the recyclability aspect, and we thus refer to the recyclable version as the green version.
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mental studies, we explore whether such a charging-for-recycling scenario, compared with
free recycling and recycling tax scenarios, can lead to a relatively higher level of adoption
of recyclable versions among customers (see, Shogren 2002, on using experimental meth-
ods for guiding environmental and climate policy). We use a subject-level measure for
the adoption of the green (recyclable) version over the standard (non-recyclable) version
in terms of the subject-level percentage of extra willingness to pay (WTP) for the Green
version. In line with previous studies on consumer durables replacements (see Guiltinan
2010 for a review) and emergency purchases (Samson and Voyer 2014), we study regular
(or new) purchase situations and emergency (or replacement) purchase situations sepa-
rately as they have been proven to have different decision-making dynamics. We find that,
compared with free recycling and recycling tax scenarios, charging for recycling increases
regular buyers’ adoption of green electronics by around 5%. For emergency buyers, the
adoption level remains the same as with the current recycling policies, in line with previ-
ous findings that emergency buyers’ decision-making situation hinders them from paying
for environmental attributes (Samson and Voyer 2014).
Our findings have clear implications for green marketing, operational aspects of recy-
cling, and environmental policy. The most promising finding in the adoption of energy-
efficient products has yielded an effect size of around 5%, while requiring both incentives
to salespeople and rebates to customers (Allcott and Sweeney 2017). Therefore, the ob-
served effect here is not negligible, especially since it comes as a byproduct of a recycling
program. From an operational perspective, our findings extend previous research that ties
recycling operations to green marketing and contradict the conventional wisdom that favors
free/promotional recycling as the beneficial bridge to coordinate the two (see, e.g., Westley
and Vredenburg 1991, Shrum et al. 1994). Precisely, our study findings show that charging
for recycling not only directly assists retailers with the operational costs of recycling, but
can also help enhance the recyclability of products entering the economy in the first place,
a factor that has been emphasized as vital to creating an efficient circular economy (Geyer
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et al. 2015, Zink and Geyer 2017).
While one cannot be definite about the outcomes on an environmental policy, the scope
of our experimental studies is to sharpen the best guesses on the potential of a new en-
vironmental policy (Shogren 2002, Chetty 2015). A limitation on charging for recycling
as an environmental policy can be pointed out as potentially having a deterring effect on
consumers’ product returns, compared with free recycling policy, and thus potentially re-
ducing the volume of products returned for recycling. However, the current state of TV and
monitor recycling can result in retailers closing their recycling programs for these products
and thus setting the volume of recycling at zero. For example, Best Buy has the largest
e-waste recycling program in the U.S., but in the states that do not allow charging for re-
cycling, it still had to shut down its recycling channel for TVs and monitors due to their
high recycling costs. Meanwhile, previous evidence showing strong positive correlations
between green purchasing behavior and recycling behavior (Biswas et al. 2000) keeps us
hopeful that a policy of charging for recycling may not significantly deter consumers’ re-
cycling as it enhances their green purchasing behavior. Hence, by changing consumers’
purchase behavior, such a policy may result in greater environmental benefits, with no or
little drawbacks on recycling volume, over merely focusing on increasing the recycling
volume alone.
Our findings also suggest potential benefits in implementing these sorts of new pro-
grams in industries other than consumer electronics to increase consumer adoption of so-
cially/environmentally friendly products. For example, in the apparel industry, utilizing
a similar charging-for-return policy by Goodwill to accept used clothes can potentially in-
crease consumers’ adoption of organic clothing, which will, in turn, motivate manufacturers
to increase using organic materials in their productions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 4.2 reviews the related
literature and builds our hypotheses; Section 4.3 describes the experimental design; Section
4.4 presents results and analyses; and finally, Section 4.5 discusses the implications of our
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findings for green marketing and environmental policy.
4.2 Hypotheses
4.2.1 Charging for Recycling and Adoption of Green Versions
Our main discussion here is that the presence of a recycling charge at the purchase point
would influence customer purchasing behavior and lead to a higher adoption of green ver-
sions of products. Based on Best Buy’s practice of charging for recycling, i.e., announcing
its recycling charge and its sale of green electronics at the same time, we find two behav-
ioral explanations most supportive of our postulation: nudging and the theory of planned
behavior. Nudging, i.e., piquing attention through indirect interventions (Thaler and Sun-
stein 2008, Leonard 2008, Sunstein 2009), has been used in many different contexts to lead
people’s actions in desired directions. The sort of nudge that aims to promote environ-
mentally friendly actions, for example, decreasing the household energy consumption (see,
e.g., Allcott and Rogers 2014), is known as the green nudge (Sunstein 2009). The theory
of planned behavior, first proposed by Ajzan (1991), has been widely used in studying peo-
ple’s green purchasing behavior (see, e.g., Ellen et al. 1991, Berger and Corbin 1992, Rice
et al. 1996, Kalafatis et al. 1999, Chan and Lau 2002).
To discuss nudging in this context, we draw a parallel with previous work on the pro-
vision of direct information to increase consumer adoption of green products. This stream
of work uses energy efficiency in green products to motivate consumers via savings in
their electricity bills as a win-win benefit in purchasing such products (see, e.g., Allcott
and Greenstone 2012). However, the work has found direct provision of information to be
an unsuccessful marketing strategy for increasing the sale of green products. Allcott and
Taubinsky (2015) found that a significant portion of the market still preferred incandes-
cent lightbulbs even after being fully informed about benefits of energy-saving lightbulbs.
Kallbekken et al. (2013) found that a salesperson’s effort had no significant effect on the
demand for energy-efficient products. Similarly, Allcott and Sweeney (2017) found that
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incentivizing salespeople to provide consumers with information on the cost savings of
energy-efficient water heaters had no effect on consumer demand.
In contrast to the evidence on the ineffectiveness of direct marketing strategies, there
are reports of successful uses of nudges to reduce energy consumption among consumers.
Allcott and Rogers (2014), in their studies of comparison-based households’ energy bills,
found the comparison-based bill to be a successful nudge that reduced households’ energy
consumption. Similarly, Dolan and Metcalfe (2013) found a significant reduction in en-
ergy consumption by nudging households to reduce their energy consumption to comply
with social norms. In reducing households’ water consumption, Ferraro and Price (2013)
found messages based on social norms and social comparisons to be more effective than
instructive descriptions.
In parallel with the above evidences, we postulate that indirectly nudging the value of
recyclability by charging for recycling will work effectively in increasing the adoption of
recyclable versions of products. How charging for recycling serves as a nudge is to in-
directly draw customers’ attention to the fact that “recycling is costly” and thus presents
“increased recyclability” as a more valuable attribute. Consumers, if asked, might have
some knowledge of the expenses/harms that recycling imposes on society and the environ-
ment. What a nudge does is to draw their attention to this fact at the purchase point, without
which this knowledge might never come to the surface or effectively play its role at the de-
cision point. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first that explores a green nudge
in the domain of consumer adoption of green products. It is worth noting that the lack of
full awareness that sometimes appears in nudges and raises criticism of restricting people’s
autonomy to act upon their own preferences (see, e.g., Hausman and Welch 2010) does not
apply to our study since we do not architect a nudge and rather investigate a byproduct of
a recycling program as a nudge.
In the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB), the main argument is that while one factor
of the planned behavior, attitude, is predominantly in favor of environmentally friendly
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purchases, the other factor, perceived behavioral control, is not always realized and thus
hinders the final behavior. According to Ajzen (1991), the nature of the perceived behav-
ioral control is uncertainty about how impactful people think their action would be on the
environment. This concern has been found to be a significant determinant of eco-friendly
behavior (see, e.g., Ellen et al. 1991, Berger and Corbin 1992, Rice et al. 1996). We postu-
late that a recycling charge will induce a belief on consumers that not buying a recyclable
product imposes a similar monetary cost to the environment. This monetary, relatable
cost will make it clearer to customers what impact they are making on the environment
by adopting recyclable versions and will thus enhance the perceived behavioral control.
This improved self-efficacy in making an eco-friendly action will, in turn, close the gap in
TPB and result in adoption of green (recyclable) products. Combining the two discussions
above, we summarize our expectation in the following hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 1. Compared with free recycling, charging for recycling will increase
adoption of green versions of products.
Although, compared with free recycling, both charging for recycling and a recycling
tax collect recycling fees from consumers, there are fundamental differences between them.
More explicitly, in contrast to charging for recycling, a recycling tax is reflected as a manda-
tory price inflation at the purchase point and at a relatively low magnitude. On one hand,
being mandatory and tying the nudge to purchase costs rather than recycling costs disturb
nudging dynamics with the recycling tax. Successful green nudges motivate people towards
voluntary, rather than forcible, contributions to environmental protection actions (Schubert
2017), and the recycling fee under the recycling tax policy lacks this. Furthermore, one
of the main reasons behind the success of nudging households with their neighbors’ en-
ergy consumption is that the information is delivered to the households together with their
energy bills, which makes the information salient and thus work as a nudge (Allcott and
Rogers 2014, Schubert 2017). In contrast to a charging-for-recycling policy that charges a
recycling fee because of accepting a product for recycling, a recycling tax policy charges
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a fee because of selling the product, which does not fit well in tying the information to the
right activity and thus creating an informational nudge.
On the other hand, even if a recycling tax can, to some level, fit as green nudge, its
relatively low magnitude may not allow it to make a strong impact. Due to being collected
upfront at the purchase point and for all products sold, a recycling tax is sensibly lower
than the recycling charge that a charging-for-recycling policy will collect at the recycling
point and only for recycled products (for example, for TVs of the same size, California’s
Electronic Waste Recycling Act charges $7 recycling tax, which is significantly lower than
the $25 recycling charge in Best Buy’s program). Hence, any possible nudging effect with
a recycling tax policy will be significantly lower than that with a charging-for-recycling
policy.
From the TPB point of view, we can postulate that, by collecting a fee at the purchase
point, the recycling tax will suggest to consumers that they are paying their contributions
to the environment and will thus leave no room for further pro-environmental actions at
this point. In this vein, Merritt et al. (2010) discuss how one act of pro-social behavior can
suppress further actions by making people feel as if they have done “enough.” With the
charging-for-recycling program, on the other hand, the similar pro-environmental action,
i.e., paying for recycling, while being present, is tied with recycling action and thus does
not interfere with or hinder the other pro-environmental action at the purchase point, i.e.,
paying more for the recyclable version. This postulation, together with the above discussion
on the dynamics of recycling tax, leads us to the following hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 2. Compared with recycling tax, charging for recycling will increase
adoption of green versions of products.
4.2.2 Consumer Heterogeneity
Bao and Ho (2015) discuss that a nudge can have heterogeneous effects on people’s deci-
sions depending on the characteristics of the situation they are in and that making the most
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of a nudge requires understanding possible heterogeneities. Allcott and Rogers (2014), in
their study of nudging households with comparison-based energy bills, found that house-
holds with consumption above average started to decrease their energy usage, while those
with consumption below average tended to increase their usage, which limited the over-
all effect to 1-2% savings in electricity. Similarly, Beshears et al. (2015), in their study of
retirement savings, found that peer information increased savings among non-unionized re-
cipients but decreased it among unionized recipients, due to differences in norms between
these two groups of workers. In this vein, Bronchetti et al. (2011) segmented people based
on their financial limitations and found that opt-in/out defaults had no impact on the saving
behavior of low-income tax filers as they had strong intentions to spend their refunds. More
related to our study, Samson and Voyer (2014) discuss that emergency purchases, compared
with regular purchases, are more prevention-focused, and thus emergency buyers may only
be willing to spend on necessary attributes in products and not much on environmental
attributes.
Emergency purchases in consumer electronics, such as TVs and monitors, in a broader
picture can be considered as replacement purchases, for which previous research has found
more nuances in behavioral influences compared with new purchase situations (see Guilti-
nan 2010, for a review). For example, Bayus (1991) and Cripps and Meyer (1994) found
that purchases due to product failure are based on different decision-making processes than
regular purchases. In line with most of the work on replacement purchases, our study con-
cerns a durable good (TV/monitor). Like most durable electronic goods, purchase cycles
for TVs/monitors have been significantly shortened,7 and in today’s consumer electron-
ics markets, the main portion of the market purchases new versions of products while
having a fully functioning version in use (Gordon 2009). Therefore, we define emer-
gency/replacement buyers as the ones who are buying a new TV to replace their broken
TV, and regular/new buyers as the ones who are buying a new TV while still having an-
7On average, around 5-7 (3-4) -year cycle is assumed for TVs (monitors).
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/06/technology/06sets.html
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other fully functioning one at home. This segmentation is in line with previous research
and captures both the dynamics of regular vs. emergency purchases as well as those of new
vs. replacement purchases. Based on previously established evidence (e.g., Bronchetti et
al. 2011, Samson and Voyer 2014), we postulate that the cost-oriented nature of emergency
purchases will overshadow the behavioral effects of the charging-for-recycling program for
emergency buyers.
HYPOTHESIS 3. The effect of charging for recycling in increasing the adoption of
green versions will be stronger for regular buyers compared with emergency buyers.
The main point of the discussion above is that a possible heterogeneous nudging effect
from charging for recycling is driven by a strong reason for a change in behavior. There
can be, of course, other consumer heterogeneity in the market that can segment consumers
into several sub-groups. Age, gender, annual income, etc., are among common sources of
consumer heterogeneity that direct green marketing usually faces. For instance, research on
direct green marketing has found that supporters of environmentalism tend to be younger
in age, as young people are more open to new ideas (see, e.g., Lee 2008 and references
therein). Houde (2014) discusses such heterogeneity in consumer adoption of energy-
efficient products via direct green marketing in more detail by relating that to consumer
sophistication with respect to collecting and processing direct information.
One of the main issues in the direct green marketing of energy-efficient products has
been discussed as cognitive limitations such as hyperbolic discounting. Direct green mar-
keting strategies usually push customers to evaluate the cost-benefit of paying a higher
purchase price for energy-efficient products in exchange for obtaining energy bill savings
in the future (Anderson and Claxton 1982, Newell and Siikamäki 2014). Such evaluations
also occur when households evaluate the benefits of taking steps to reduce their energy con-
sumption to achieve future energy bill savings. However, green nudges in this area, e.g.,
nudging households with neighbors’ energy consumptions, has been found to be successful
by going around such cognitive limitations (Allcott and Rogers 2014, Schubert 2017). With
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green nudges avoiding this issue in direct green marketing, we can expect that they would
also go around other issues that direct green marketing faces—in particular, consumer het-
erogeneity as discussed above.
Therefore, upon Hypothesis 3 characterizing the main source of difference in behavior,
we expect that charging for recycling, as a green nudge, will have a homogenous effect
across all consumers, irrespective of their demographic heterogeneity. This expectation is
in line with previous findings in nudge in other contexts, as well. For example, Azmat and
Iriberri (2010), in studying how students’ performance was influenced by learning their
relative ranks, found a homogeneous nudging effect for both genders after differentiating
the effect for the tails of the distribution from middle-rank students. Referring to common
sources of heterogeneity, such as age and gender, by “consumer heterogeneity,” we present
this expectation in the following hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 4. The effect of charging for recycling in increasing the adoption of
green versions will be robust to consumer heterogeneity.
4.3 Experimental Study
4.3.1 Design
The objective of our experiment is to compare charging for recycling with two current re-
cycling policies (i.e., free recycling and recycling tax policies) as the baseline to extract
its relative different effect on the adoption of green versions of products. To keep our
experimental design in line with reality, we choose $25 as the dollar amount charged for
recycling. In addition, since Best Buy’s program charges only for TVs/monitors, we use
a TV as the electronic product in our experiment. With California’s Electronic Waste Re-
cycling Act, the fee charged at the purchase point is based on the size of the purchased
electronic product, which is $7 for products larger than 35 inches. Hence, we choose $7 as
the recycling tax on the purchased TV in our experiment. We use technical specifications of
a real market TV (product specifications are available in Appendix C) and create two iden-
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tical versions of the TV, Standard and Green, where “designed for increased recyclability”8
is the only extra attribute in the Green version.
Similar to real market situations, where customers discover one version of a product
first and then find about the other version, participants in our experiment are first offered
one version of the TV (Standard or Green),9 and after indicating their WTPs for that ver-
sion, are offered both versions and asked to indicate their WTPs for both. Participants are
allowed to change their starting WTPs for the Standard (or Green) version after being of-
fered the other. We use participants’ final WTPs for the Green and Standard versions in
the analysis to extract their adoption of the Green version. Realistically, the starting WTP
might influence the following WTPs for the Green and Standard versions and hence the
gap between them by taking effect as an arbitrary anchor (Ariely et al. 2003, Levav et al.
2012). Therefore, by directly asking participants about their WTPs, our design leaves it
to the participants how much they are willing to pay for the TV to start with. This further
takes into account subjective factors, such as the income level, on participants’ valuation
of a given TV and consequently their extra willing to pay for the Green version. These
are essential for real market simulation and thus could not be ignored in the experimental
design.
The measure of adoption we use in our analyses, nonetheless, nullifies both a possible
anchoring effect from the starting WTP and the inherent subjectivity issues, and extracts
the adoption in a way that allows us to have between-group comparisons. That is, any
difference unaccounted for in the subject-level extra WTP for the Green version in differ-
ent groups comes purely from the manipulations of our interests, namely, recycling pol-
icy and purchase situation. To do so, we use the subject-level percentage of extra WTP
for the Green version relative to the participant’s own WTP for the Standard version as
the measure of adoption, and compare its average between different experimental groups.
8This is the phrase that is being used in the marketing of Green TVs/monitors by Best Buy and is a
description of EPEAT-registered electronics as well.
9This ordering is counterbalanced in the experiment, and we perform further analyses to ensure that the
results are independent of the ordering.
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We refer to this variable as (extra WTPG)% and build any between-group comparisons
around that rather than simply comparing the average of extra WTP for the Green ver-
sion between different groups. This variable further allows us to investigate both the mere
adoption—through (extra WTPG)%>0—and the intensified adoption—through the value
of (extra WTPG)%—in our between-group compositions. It is noted that an alternative
to asking participants about their WTPs could be using a choice-based design, providing
participants with multiple ranges of prices for the starting TV, and then multiple ranges of
price gaps between the Standard and Green versions to capture all the same information our
design provides. This would, however, result in choice sets with too many options, yet not
covering every possible WTP and thus not being able to go around the possible anchoring
and subjectivity issues completely.
To create a clear separation of the purchase situations in the experiment, for emer-
gency/replacement buyers, the situation involves customers replacing a broken TV with
a new one, and for regular/new buyers, the situation involves purchasing a new TV for
another room of the house. With the two baseline recycling policies and the charging-
for-recycling program, and separating the purchase situations for regular/new buyers and
emergency/replacement buyers, we thus have a 3 × 2 design as summarized in Table 4.1.
Experimental descriptions will be discussed in detail in Section 4.3.3.
4.3.2 Incentive Compatibility, Social Desirability, and Attention Check
To capture the exact setting and time point of decision making, e.g., deciding to purchase
a new TV while already owning a broken (or fully functioning) one, we use an imaginary
situation in the experiment and ask participants to indicate their WTPs assuming the de-
scribed purchase situation (see the next section for the experimental descriptions). With
imaginary situations, although the experiment cannot be an incentive-compatible design,
there is ample evidence that, if designed properly, respondents’ decisions do not differ sig-
nificantly from real situations (see Carmon and Ariely 2000 and references therein) and
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Table 4.1: Experimental framework.
the experiment could yet yield similar insights. More similar to our context, Ungemach et
al. (2018) used imaginary situation experiments with flat participation payments to study
consumer preference between environmentally friendly and regular cars. As Meloy et al.
(2006) discuss, these sorts of experimental designs are of particular importance in environ-
mental studies (e.g., green purchase behavior, environmentally friendly actions, etc.) where
incentive-aligned payment often hinders understanding people’s intrinsically motivated be-
haviors.
In addition, the comparison-based approach of our study, together with the nature of
the adoption measure we use, enables us to go around the need for incentive compatibility
in obtaining reliable results. Precisely, we do not use the raw gap in participants’ WTPs
for the Green and Standard versions in our analyses, and rather utilize participants’ extra
WTP for the Green version relative to their own WTP for the Standard version. More
importantly, we compare participants’ adoption of the Green version under the charging-
for-recycling scenario with that under the baseline scenarios and are only interested in a
net difference that the charging-for-recycling scenario can make. Hence, any possible price
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inflation for the Green version, due to lack of incentive compatibility, will be cancelled
out in extracting the net difference, and the results will be driven purely by the effect of
charging for recycling. We keep the same comparison-based approach in analyzing both
the regular/new purchase situation and the emergency/replacement situation.
Another important point to consider in the design and analyses is the possible social de-
sirability effect in the results. The social desirability effect, or Experimenter Demand Effect
(EDE), is about change in experimental subjects’ decisions due to what might constitute ap-
propriate behavior (Zizzo 2009). In other words, subjects may give priority to being “good
subjects” and feel committed to making a decision that assists the experimenter. As Zizzo
(2009) discusses, in most environmental/social studies, this can be an issue from two points:
first, using an incentive-compatible design and inducing to participants to maximize their
monetary benefits may deter them from their environmental/social utilities in honoring the
induced, desired performance; second, if the environmentally/socially conscious decision
is positively correlated with experimenter demand (i.e., if participants show environmen-
tal/social consciousness in their decision because of assuming that it is what the experi-
menter is looking for), that would lead the results in a biased direction. Our experimental
study takes care of the latter by using the comparison-based design. In these comparisons,
there are comparable sources of environmental/social desirability in both the treatment and
the control (baseline) groups. In both the free recycling and charging-for-recycling sce-
narios, participants have comparable opportunities to show a socially desirable decision,
i.e., paying more for the Green version, if they are influenced by the EDE. This neutralizes
the effect of the EDE, further ensuring that the net outcome is driven by our hypothesized
effects. When comparing the recycling tax and charging-for-recycling scenarios, the sit-
uation is the same. Both scenarios may partly satisfy participants’ environmental/social
consciousness (with the recycling tax scenario, participants are default with $7 recycling
fee; and with the charging-for-recycling scenario, they are default with a $25 recycling
charge) while leaving comparable opportunities for showing social desirability (i.e., by
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paying more for the Green version). Hence, there are comparable levels of possible EDE
in both. Therefore, a composition-based analysis will cancel out possible EDE in the treat-
ment scenario, and the net difference with the charging-for-recycling scenario will be due
to the hypothesized effects.
To ensure the reliability of the responses, we use a strict attention check question at
the end of the experiment to filter inattentive respondents. Abbey and Meloy (2017) dis-
cuss a wide range of attention check questions commonly implemented in experimental
studies. Our attention check question tests whether participants understand both of the
treatments in the descriptions: whether the situation was a regular/new purchase or an
emergency/replacement purchase; and whether the recycling was free or whether there was
a fee associated with it. With such a test that covers the focal points of the task, we do
not further filter participants based on their response time; neither do we use out-of-context
questions to test participants’ precision.
4.3.3 Descriptions
The experimental description includes three short parts: first, a starting description with
manipulation on the purchase situation (regular/new vs. emergency/replacement); second,
a description for manipulation on the recycling policy; and third, a description stating the
difference between the Standard and Green versions of the TV. Full experimental descrip-
tions are available in Appendix C.
The experimental description starts with telling participants whether the situation is a
regular/new or an emergency/replacement purchase. For the former, we ask participants to
imagine they already have an almost-new TV at home and are thinking about buying an
extra one for another room. For the latter, we ask participants to imagine their TV is not
working anymore and that they need to buy a new one.
The second part of the description creates the treatment effect regarding the recycling
policy. In doing so, we try to match the description with Best Buy’s announcement on
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its new charging-for-recycling program as much as possible. With the free recycling sce-
nario, the description mentions that the retailer also has a recycling program and accepts
broken TVs for recycling free of charge, in line with Best Buy’s previous free recycling
program. With the charging-for-recycling scenario, on the other hand, the description men-
tions that the retailer also has a recycling program and, due to the cost of managing TV
recycling, charges $25 to accept broken TVs for recycling. This short description captures
Best Buy’s announcement on its new recycling program together with the reasoning behind
it as mentioned in the announcement. We avoid adding any further detailed information in
the interest of having the best reflection of reality. For example, the description leaves it to
the participants what to do with their broken TVs in the emergency/replacement purchase
groups, either with the free recycling or the charging-for-recycling scenario.
To have as much consistency between different groups as possible and to leave the
sources of difference only to the intended manipulation in this part, descriptions use the
same wording when describing the recycling policy (accepts broken TVs for recycling
free of charge, or charges $25 to accept broken TVs for recycling) in both regular/new
and emergency/replacement purchase situations. This leaves the difference between the
two purchase situations only to the first part of the experimental description and keeps the
focus of this part on the recycling policy manipulation. The word “broken” is to ensure
aligning the descriptions between the two parts in the emergency/replacement purchase
situation in which participants face broken TVs. At the same time, it makes sense for the
regular/new purchase situation as participants are meant to assume they are not concerned
with returning broken TVs for recycling at the purchase point.
Similar to the charging-for-recycling scenario, the recycling policy manipulation in the
recycling tax scenario is about a recycling fee, and in line with reality, the description
mentions that the retailer also has a recycling program and, due to the cost of managing
TV recycling, charges a $7 recycling fee in addition to the sale price for all TVs, regardless
of the brand or technical specifications. We do not use the word “tax” in the description
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because the $7 fee associated with California’s Electronic Waste Recycling Act of 2003 is
not being stated as a “tax” in practice.
The experimental descriptions, and in particular the first two parts conveying the two
manipulations, were refined through several pre-runs, where participants were asked to
provide explanations behind their thinking. This open-ended question was to ensure the
clarity of the descriptions to participants without having to list further detailed information
in the descriptions. From what we obtained from this open-ended question with the final
version of the descriptions, participants’ thinking was around environmental concerns with
recycling (e.g., not being green, etc.) rather than rational monetary calculations.
The last part of the experimental description tells participants about the technical spec-
ifications of the TV (Green or Standard version), presented alongside the picture of the TV,
and asks them about their WTPs for the offered TV. For the Green version, the description
clearly states that it also is a Green TV, designed for increased recyclability at its end of
life. Upon indicating their WTP for the offered version (Green or Standard), participants
go to the next stage, where they are first reminded about the WTP they previously indicated
for the offered version and then are told to assume that they find there is also a Green [or
Standard] version of that TV, wherein both versions are shown together. The description
points out clearly that both versions have the exact same features except the increased recy-
clability in the Green version. Participants are asked, in light of this new information, about
their WTPs for each of the TVs. It is noted that in the recycling tax groups, participants are
asked to indicate their WTP inclusive of the $7 fee, in order to capture the final price paid
for the TV as in reality.
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4.3.4 Procedure
We recruited a sample of 838 participants (46.5% female and 53.1% male;10 Mage=39.8,
SD=12.1) through Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT)11 and paid a flat fee for their partic-
ipation (the same as in similar studies in AMT, e.g., Ungemach et al. 2018). The pay-
ment proportionally was over the minimum wage per hour at the time the experiment was
run. Participants were eligible to participate if they were at least 18 years old and were
U.S. residents. Upon agreeing to participate in the study, participants were randomly as-
signed to one of the six experimental groups (as shown in Table 4.1) and were asked about
their WTPs for the Standard and Green TVs in the order explained in the previous sec-
tion. In all groups, following the main experimental task, participants also provided an
(optional) explanation of their thinking behind their decision. We also asked participants
about the clarity of the descriptions and experimental tasks. The average clarity score on
a 1-5 scale (5 being the highest) was 4.5. The experiment ended with the attention check
question and demographic questions. A majority of the participants (73.6%) indicated hav-
ing earned a bachelor’s degree or having a college-level credit. The average income level
was between $26,000-$75,000, and most of the participants had an income level between
$26,000-$50,000.
4.4 Results and Analyses
Among 838 participants, around 5-7 in each group (36 in total; 4.3%) indicated WTPs for
the Green TV lower than their WTPs for the Standard TV. Based on their explanations, we
call them anti-Green participants—consumers with strong doubts about green and environ-
mentally friendly products (Ginsberg and Bloom 2004). Exclusion or inclusion of these
participants in the sample does not make a difference in the main results and findings, and
we keep them in the sample as we do not have a predetermined reason to exclude them.
100.4% of the participants preferred not to indicate their gender.
11Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) has become a popular platform for experimental studies, and evidence
has endorsed AMT as a reliable source of experimental data (see, e.g., Lee et al. 2018 and references therein).
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We filter responses based on the attention check question at the end of the experimental
task, which yielded a rejection rate under 22.1%.12 Finally, we exclude six participants
who were not able to enter a valid number as to their WTPs in either/both of the questions.
The focal point of our analyses is isolating the effect of the $25 charge for recycling on
the subject-level percentage of extra WTP for the Green version, which we have defined
as the measure of adoption. We refer to this variable as (extra WTPG)%. In analyzing this
variable, our experiment uses a between- and within-subject mixed model design: having
three recycling policies as a between-subject manipulation while measuring within-subject
WTPs for the Standard and Green versions. In addition, the two purchase situations (regu-
lar vs. emergency) and the two orders (Standard first vs. Green first) add to the between-
subject manipulation. Hence, in total, our experimental design is a 3×2×2×2 mixed model
based on recycling policy × purchase situation × order × product version. Before going
into the details of analyzing our main variable of interest, i.e., (extra WTPG)%, through
regressions, it is worth analyzing this mixed model first in order to uncover sources of vari-
ation in (extra WTPG)%. We use mixed-model ANOVA, which is the perfect methodology
for a mixed between- and within-subject experimental design (see Abbey et al. 2015 that
used this method to study customer preference for new and remanufactured products).
As Table 4.2 shows, the mixed-model analysis suggests a statistically significant effect
from recycling policy under some conditions. The first row of Table 4.2 shows that there is a
statistically significant difference between WTPs for Green and Standard versions. The rest
of the table investigates any effect from between-subject manipulations on this difference.
The second row shows that without differentiating the purchase situation, recycling policy
manipulation has no statistically significant effect on within-subject difference between
WTPs for Green and Standard versions. However, the third row uncovers that depending
on the purchase situation, recycling policy can, in fact, increase within-subject extra WTP
12Given its relatively small size (see Abbey and Meloy 2017 that discuss data exclusion rates in attention
check failures), inclusion of this data set in the analysis did not change the final results, nor it influenced the
significance levels, and only slightly changed the p-values.
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for the Green version. Finally, the last row shows that the order in which participants
discover the first version has no statistically significant effect on the effect from recycling
policy manipulation.
Table 4.2: Mixed-model analysis.
To further explore whether the observed effect from recycling policy manipulation is
driven by the charging-for-recycling scenario, the recycling tax scenario, or both, Tables
4.3a-4.3c repeat the same analysis of Table 4.2 by contrasting only two scenarios of re-
cycling policy (charging for recycling vs. other policies, recycling tax vs. other policies,
and free recycling vs. other policies). In this case, the mixed-model design reduces to
2×2×2×2, which allows us to isolate the observed effect for different recycling policies.
As Tables 4.3a-4.3c demonstrate, it is the charging-for-recycling scenario that, compared
with free recycling and recycling tax scenarios, makes a statistically significant difference
on participants’ extra WTP for the Green version.
The mixed-model ANOVA uncovered that charging for recycling can have a statisti-
cally significant effect on consumers’ extra WTP for the Green version in some purchase
situations. This suggests that it is worth conducting subsequent detailed analyses to further
investigate and understand the observed effect. These detailed investigations would also
determine whether our hypotheses in Section 4.2 are supported. We structure our subse-
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Table 4.3a: Mixed-model analysis with charging for recycling scenario vs. other recycling
scenarios.
Table 4.3b: Mixed-model analysis with recycling tax scenario vs. other recycling scenarios.
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Table 4.3c: Mixed-model analysis with free recycling scenario vs. other recycling scenar-
ios.
quent analyses based on analyzing the effect of charging for recycling on the adoption of
the Green version for the two customer segments, i.e., customers in regular/new and emer-
gency/replacement purchase situations (Analysis 1), further analyzing the robustness of the
effect to common consumer heterogeneities in direct green marketing (Analysis 2), and
characterizing the effect in terms of green market expansion and green market intensifica-
tion (Analysis 3).
4.4.1 Analysis 1: Charging for Recycling and Adoption of the Green Version in Regular/New
and Emergency/Replacement Purchase Situations
The focus of our analysis here is to statistically compare the average of adoption measure,
i.e., (extra WTPG)%, under the charging-for-recycling scenario with that under free recy-
cling and recycling tax scenarios as the baseline. Given our hypotheses structure and what
uncovered in the mixed-model analysis, we perform this comparison separately for the reg-
ular/new purchase situation and the emergency/replacement purchase situation. With the
mixed-model ANOVA, we analyzed what influenced any change in participants’ WTPs for
the Green and Standard versions. We now aim to compare participants’ adoption of the
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Green version in different groups. Hence, for reasons discussed earlier, we look at the
adoption measure (extra WTPG)% rather than raw WTPs. Figures 1 and 2 show the av-
erage of this variable for each experimental group. In the regular/new purchase situation,
the recycling charge increases the average of (extra WTPG)% by 4.9 compared with free
recycling (t = 2.687, p < 0.004) and by 3.4 compared with the recycling tax (t = 1.704,
p < 0.046). It makes no difference, however, for the emergency/replacement purchase sit-
uation relative to the baselines (-0.25 compared with free recycling, t = 0.152, p > 0.879;
and -0.66 compared with the recycling tax, t = 0.416, p > 0.678).
Figure 4.1: Average of (extra WTPG)% for the two purchase situations with the three
recycling policies. Note: Error bars are standard errors of means (SEM).
Figure 4.2: The effect of charging for recycling on the average of (extra WTPG)% for the
two purchase situations. Note: Error bars are standard errors of means (SEM).
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Discussion: Our analysis reveals that, in line with our general expectations in Hypothe-
sis 1 and 2, the presence of a recycling charge increases participants’ adoption of the Green
version through increasing their (extra WTPG)%, compared with both free recycling and
recycling tax policies. The results show that although the same information (i.e., “due to
the cost of managing TV recycling”) is being communicated to participants in both the
charging-for-recycling and recycling tax groups, as predicted, the dynamics of a recycling
tax are more similar to those of free recycling and thus result in an adoption level more com-
parable to a free recycling than a charging-for-recycling policy. Moreover, comparing the
recycling tax group with the free recycling group, to which this information is not provided,
our observation provides further evidence that mere information provision is not an effec-
tive policy in increasing adoption of green versions of products. Finally, the results show
that as predicted in Hypothesis 3, the cost-oriented nature of the emergency/replacement
purchase situation does not let the effect realize under this purchase situation; hence, the
adoption remains at the same level as in the baseline. This observation also provides sup-
porting evidence for Samson and Voyer’s (2014) observation that, compared with regular
purchase situations, decision making in emergency purchase situations is more prevention-
focused and hinders paying for extra attributes such as environmental attributes. It is also
worth noting that with the adoption level remaining unchanged in all scenarios under the
emergency/replacement purchase situation, the results endorse that, as reasoned in Section
4.3.2, our experimental design does not fall under issues pertinent to the social desirability
effect. This ensures the reliability of the extracted difference in the adoption level between
the charging-for-recycling scenario and the baseline scenarios under the regular/new pur-
chase situation.
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4.4.2 Analysis 2: Robustness of the Effect to Common Consumer Heterogeneity beyond
the Purchase Situation
Our analysis here aims to explore whether the observed effect is robust to consumer het-
erogeneity besides the main segmentation that Analysis 1 considered. We use participants’
demographics, i.e., gender and age, to define consumer heterogeneity, which is a common
approach in marketing studies. We separate the participants into young (ageL) and senior
(ageH) based on the cut-off age of 40 reflecting the average age of participants (i.e., 39.8;
see Section 4.3.5). We also exclude the participants (0.4% of the experimental pool) who
did not indicate their gender in separating the participants into male and female groups.
We start by repeating the mixed-model analysis of Table 4.2 considering gender and age
extra sources of between-group manipulation. This results in a 3 × 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 × 2
mixed-model. Table 4.4 shows the results of this analysis. As seen, neither age nor gender
has a statistically significant influence on the difference between participants’ WTPs for
the Green and Standard versions under any of the recycling policies or purchase situations.
Table 4.5: Mixed-model analysis including participants’ demographics.
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We further use regression analyses to complement the above analysis on participants’
demographics. Following up on Analysis 1, we run the following regression that considers
dummy variables ageH and male together with the three recycling policies for both the
regular/new purchase situation and the emergency/replacement purchase situation:
(extraWTPG)%i = α0+α1(ageH)i+α2(male)i+α3(ageH×male)i+α4(recycling tax)i
+α5(recycling charge)i+α6(recycling tax×ageH)i+α7(recycling charge×ageH)i+
α8(recycling tax×male)i+α9(recycling charge×male)i+α6(recycling tax×ageH×
male)i + α7(recycling charge× ageH ×male)i + εi
Table 4.5 shows the result of this regression for both purchase situations. As seen, the
observed effects remains statistically independent of participants’ demographics.13
It is worth noting that, as discussed earlier, the measure we use for the adoption of
the Green version, i.e., (extra WTPG)%, isolates the extracted effect from participants’
income levels altogether. This was an important consideration because it is plausible that,
for the same TV, a participant with a high income level might indicate a higher WTP than a
participant with a low income level. Similarly, it might also be the case that the participants’
starting WTPs, taking the role of an arbitrary anchor (Ariely et al. 2003, Levav et al.
2012), may further influence their extra WTPs for the Green version. This, however, is
most likely not an issue with the measure (extra WTPG)% as it rules out the effect of
the income level. To quantitatively confirm this, we run a linear regression that considers
the participant’s starting WTP as a potential anchor together with the effect of different
recycling policies under the two purchase situations. Since starting WTPs can potentially
be higher in the Green-first order, compared to the Standard-first order, we further consider
an extra interaction term for the Green-first order to capture this possibility:
(extraWTPG)%i = α0+α1(startingWTP )i+α2(startingWTP×GreenFirst)i+
13It is noted that the low R-squares in regression models are due to the nature of the dependent variable
(extra WTPG)%, as its value cannot be directly driven by the magnitude of the recycling charge or recycling
tax and is rather an indicator of the participants’ adoption of the Green version. It is not uncommon to have
these levels of R-squares in regressions, considering the nature of dependent or independent variables (see,
for example, Allcott and Sweeney’s 2017 regression results with low R-squares in the range of 0.01, 0.02,
0.04, 0.05 in a context similar to ours).
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Table 4.6: The observed effect in Analysis 1 considering participants’ demographics in the
analysis.
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α3(recycling tax)i + α4(recycling charge)i + εi
Table 4.6 shows the result of this regression. As seen, participants’ starting WTP has
zero effect on their adoption of the Green version irrespective of recycling policy and pur-
chase situation. In line with the findings of Analysis 1, only the recycling charge with the
charging-for-recycling scenario works as an informational anchor with a statistically sig-
nificant effect on the adoption of the Green version among participants, and only in the
regular/new purchase group.
Table 4.7: The effect of starting WTP on the adoption of the Green version.
Discussion: The analysis above supports our Hypothesis 4 that, apart from the main
source of difference considered in Hypothesis 3, the observed effect from charging for
recycling is robust to common sources of consumer heterogeneity. The regression analysis
using (extra WTPG)%, which rules out the effect of income level and starting WTP, shows
that the participants in the regular/new purchase situation, regardless of their demographics,
anchor to the recycling charge ($25) to shape their subject-level valuation of the extra
attribute “increased recyclability” in the Green version. In line with the findings of Analysis
1, this sort of anchoring is not statistically significant with the recycling tax, nor occurs in
the emergency/replacement purchase situation. Our analysis confirms that the main and
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only source of heterogeneity in the effect of the recycling charge as a green nudge with
the charging-for-recycling program is the purchase situation, and the effect is robust to
other sources of consumer heterogeneity commonly considered in direct marketing. This
result is in line with previous findings in nudge, for example, Azmat and Iriberri’s (2010)
observation that while a nudge can have heterogeneous effects in the presence of a strong
source of change in behavior, it is robust to common sources of consumer heterogeneity.
4.4.3 Analysis 3: Characterizing the Effect in Terms of Green Market Expansion and
Green Market Intensification
The objective of our analysis here is to characterize the observed effect from charging
for recycling in terms of green market expansion and green market intensification. The
motivation behind this analysis is some observations, for example, by Ho et al. (2016), that
informational nudges to reduce negative externalities have stronger effects on people who
are intrinsically inclined to be pro-social. Therefore, in this analysis, we aim to understand
whether charging for recycling increases the number of participants with (extra WTP)%>0
and whether it intensifies the (extra WTP)% among participants. To do so, we first look at
the portion of participants with (extra WTP)%>0 in each group. Figure 3 shows that this
portion remains roughly the same across all groups (between 60-70%). Furthermore, as
seen in Figures 4 and 5, we obtain a similar trend for participants with (extra WTP)%>0 to
what we previously observed for all participants in Analysis 1: In the regular/new purchase
situation, the recycling charge increases the average of (extra WTPG)% by 6.3 compared
with free recycling (t = 2.964, p < 0.002) and by 5.2 compared with the recycling tax
(t = 2.043, p < 0.022); meanwhile, it makes no difference for emergency/replacement
purchases (0.28 compared with free recycling, t = 0.193, p > 0.847; and 0.33 compared
with the recycling tax, t = 0.213, p > 0.831). In addition, as Tables 4.7-4.10 show, we
obtain similar qualitative results with mixed-model analysis and repeating Analysis 2 on
consumer heterogeneity for participants with (extra WTP)%>0.
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Figure 4.3: Portion of participants with (extra WTPG)%¿0 for the two purchase situations
with the three recycling policies.
Figure 4.4: Average of (extra WTPG)% for the two purchase situations with the three
recycling policies for participants with (extra WTPG)%¿0. Note: Error bars are standard
errors of means (SEM).
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Figure 4.5: The effect of charging for recycling on the average of (extra WTPG)% for
the two purchase situations for participants with (extra WTPG)%¿0. Note: Error bars are
standard errors of means (SEM).
Table 4.8: Mixed-model analysis for participants with (extra WTPG)%>0.
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Table 4.9: Mixed-model analysis including participants’ demographics for participants
with (extra WTPG)%>0.
Discussion: In Analysis 3, we repeated our previous analyses only for participants with
(extra WTPG)%>0. With the baseline free recycling and recycling tax policies, around 60-
70% of participants had (extra WTPG)%>0. The observation made in Analysis 3 shows
that the charging-for-recycling program illustrates its effect through intensifying the adop-
tion of the Green version among this segment of participants. In other words, charging for
recycling intensifies the willingness to adopt the Green version among the participants who
have slight intentions to pay more for environmentally friendly and green products. This
is in line with Ho’s et al. (2016) observation that informational nudges in the domain of
environmentalism have stronger effects on people with slight pro-social intentions. This
further supports our general expectation in Hypotheses 1 and 2 that charging for recycling
will improve self-efficacy in the consumer side to act upon their pre-existing environmen-
tal intentions. Nonetheless, the analysis shows that our expectation in Hypothesis 3 that
the cost-oriented nature of emergency/replacement purchase situations will hinder such ef-
fects still applies. Finally, the analysis yields the same expectation as in Hypothesis 4 on
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Table 4.10: The observed effect in Analysis 1 considering participants’ demographics for
participants with (extra WTPG)%>0.
Table 4.11: The effect of starting WTP on the adoption of the Green version for participants
with (extra WTPG)%>0.
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consumer heterogeneity beyond the purchase situation.
4.5 General Discussion and Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we examined the effect of a charging-for-recycling program on consumer
adoption of green versions of consumer electronics. Our experiments showed that, com-
pared with free recycling and recycling tax policies, charging for recycling may enhance
adoption of green versions by around 5%, on average. This finding is particularly reward-
ing from a green marketing point of view, given that costly direct green marketing strate-
gies have been unsuccessful in increasing consumer adoption of energy-efficient products
(Deutsch 2010a, Deutsch 2010b, Allcott and Sweeney 2017). Comparing it with one of
the most promising findings in this area, which has found a 5% increase in adoption of
energy-efficient products by incentivizing salespeople and rebating customers (Allcott and
Sweeney 2017), the observed effect here has merits as an alternative green marketing strat-
egy. More importantly, direct green marketing usually focuses on energy efficiency, high-
lighting the pecuniary benefits to customers from saving energy, which limits its applica-
tion only to products with high energy consumption, such as air conditioners, refrigerators,
washing machines, and dryers (Ward et al. 2011). Charging for recycling, on the other
hand, uses the recyclability of goods and can thus target almost all consumer electronics,
irrespective of their energy consumption level. In addition, charging for recycling as an
indirect marketing strategy can avoid the green marketing myopia that occurs with some
green advertisements (Ottman et al. 2006); can avoid cognitive limitations, such as hyper-
bolic discounting, that deter customers from making extra payments for energy efficiency
(Anderson and Claxton 1982, Newell and Siikamäki 2014); and can be immune to com-
mon consumer heterogeneity issues in direct green marketing (Houde 2014). Moreover, it
should be noted that the observed effect in this study was merely a byproduct of a recycling
program for retailers that primarily aims to assist them with the operational costs of their
recycling systems. Therefore, any positive impact, even a small one, is an extra benefit for
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retailers and the environment.
Our findings also suggest that current environmental laws that prohibit retailers from
charging for recycling may be counterproductive. Free recycling that has been widely pur-
sued (for instance, Directive 2012/19/EU, which mandates manufacturers to collect used
consumer electronics from customers for recycling free of charge) primarily aims to in-
crease the number of products being recycled in the economy as the initial step in creating
a circular economy (Ellen MacArthur Foundation 2015, Lewandowski 2016). However, it
may fail to achieve its purpose for two reasons: first, because retailers may be forced to
leave the recycling business in order to avoid its operational costs; and second, because
free recycling fails to focus consumer attention on green products at the point of purchase.
Moreover, based on previous evidence of the strong positive correlation between green pur-
chasing behavior and recycling behavior (Biswas et al. 2000), we can hope that consumer
adoption of green versions will also result in higher willingness to recycle at the recycling
point. As Merritt et al. (2010) discuss, a pro-social behavior of adopting a recyclable ver-
sion may induce more pro-social behavior, such as a commitment to recycle at the end of
a product’s life, and there is abundant evidence that inducing commitment can have a sig-
nificant long-term influence on recycling behavior (see Osbaldiston and Schott 2012, for a
review).
In line with the above, and more related to the habit formation (see, e.g., Fuhrer 2000,
Carroll et al. 2000), Best Buy’s program may also change customers’ purchase behav-
ior for more consumer electronics than just TVs/monitors. In its current implementa-
tion, Best Buy’s charging-for-recycling program announces the $25 charge (for accept-
ing TVs/monitors for recycling) on its recycling channel, where it collects many other
products and where it also provides customers with the opportunity for “Buying Greener
Electronics.” Based on the abundant evidence on habit formations in consumer consump-
tion/purchase behavior (see, e.g., Alessie and Lusardi 1997, Zhen et al. 2011), customers’
adoption of green TVs/monitors driven by the charging-for-recycling program can also ex-
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tend to adoption of green versions of other consumer electronics, as well. Even if such a
habit extends only to a limited number of products (for example, computers, tablets, and
printers, which customers may perceive to be in the same product family as TVs/monitors),
the outcome can still be significant at the macro level.
Finally, our findings in this study also provide insights for other industries as to consid-
ering the sort of return programs and policies that can result in overall more positive im-
pacts with the circular economy and social/environmental responsibility perspectives. One
of these cases is the apparel industry and consumer adoption of organic clothing. Good-
will, for example, accepts used clothes free of charge to prepare them for reuse by those
in need. Implementing a similar charging-for-return program here can potentially increase
consumers’ adoption of organic clothing at the purchase point. Such a consumer behavior
will further encourage manufacturers towards more socially/environmentally responsible






The original and new versions’ specifications under a low innovation in the new version:
The original and new versions’ specifications under a high innovation in the new version:
Robustness check on using the same participants for both innovation levels:
The objective of our robustness check here is to ensure that no ordering effect occurs be-
tween the two questions for ‘low innovation’ and ‘high innovation’ with using the same
participants for both innovation levels. The best way to check this is to repeat the analysis
only with the first question that the participants answered. This would resemble an experi-
ment that uses different participants for different innovation levels. Therefore, we collected
relatively more responses in the first market setting, to have fairly enough data points after
cutting them in half, and thus limit our robustness check to this market setting.
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Table A1 shows the result of this robustness check. The ‘LH participants’ refers to
the participants who answered the ‘low innovation’ question first and their responses is
bing used for the ‘low innovation’ case, and the ‘HL participants’ are the participants who
answered the ‘high innovation’ question first and we use their responses for the ‘high inno-
vation’ case.
Table A1: Robustness check on using the same participants for both innovation level.
Further Analyses in Section 2.4:
In what follows, we repeat Regression (3) for when the original purchase price is the influ-
ential anchor and for when the new version’s price is the influential anchor. With the the
former, the Curr in Regression (3) is replaced with Opp:
refUj = βoOppj + βddummy Secj + βodOpp× dummy Secj + εj
and with the latter, it is replaced with New:
refUj = βnNewj + βddummy Secj + βndNew × dummy Secj + εj
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Table A2: Regression (3) for when the original purchase price is the influential anchor.
Table A3: Regression (3) for when the new version’s price is the influential anchor.
Proofs:
The manufacturer’s optimal pricing in the anonymous case:
With cH = 0 in Equation (9), ΠA2 reduces to Π
A
2 = [1− θH ]θHV∆ + [θ1 − θL]θLVL, which
yields separate maximization problems for the new and the original versions in period
two. Define θ∗ = argmax(1 − θ)θ, and θ̂∗ = argmax(θ1 − θ)θ for a given θ1. For
uniform distribution, θ∗ = 1
2
and θ̂∗ = θ1
2
. Using F.O.C. for θH and θL in ΠA2 , we get
θ∗H = θ
∗ and θ∗L = θ̂
∗. With that, we have ΠA∗2 = [1 − θ∗]θ∗V∆ + [θ1 − θ̂∗]θ̂∗VL. The
manufacturer’s total profit is ΠA(θ1) = ΠA1 + δΠ
A∗
2 . First period’s cut-off and price are
obtained from θ1VL + δθLVL − p1 = 0, where θLVL is the guaranteed buyback price in
period two either through the manufacturer or through the secondary market, and we have
ΠA1 = [1 − θ1][θ1VL + δθLVL] for the manufacturer’s period-one profit. With backward
induction, and after some mathematical simplifications, ΠA(θ1) = ΠA1 + δΠ
A∗
2 = [1 −
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The manufacturer’s optimal pricing in the semi-anonymous case, with no overlapping
production in period two:
With cH = 0 in Equation (7), ΠSn2 reduces to Π
Sn
2 = [1−θu][θHVH−αp1]+[θ1−θH ]θHVH .
From the first expression, the optimal θu would be either as low as possible or equal to 1,
depending on the sign of θHVH − αp1, thus θ∗u = θ1 or 1. Assume α is not very large so
that θHVH ≥ αp1 is guaranteed in optimality. Thus, ΠSn2 = [1− θ1][θHVH − αp1] + [θ1 −
θH ]θHVH . From period one, we have p1 = θ1VL − δθ1V∆ + δθHVH , by which ΠSn2 can be
rewritten as ΠSn2 = −α[1 − θ1][θ1VL − δθ1V∆ + δθHVH ] + [1 − θH ]θHVH . Using F.O.C.
for θH yields θ∗H =
1−αδ(1−θ1)
2
. With backward induction, and given ΠSn1 = [1− θ1][θ1VL−
δθ1V∆ + δθHVH ], after some mathematical simplifications: ΠSn(θ1) = ΠSn1 + δΠ
Sn∗
2 =
(1− αδ)[1− θ1][θ1VL − δθ1V∆ + δ−αδ
2(1−θ1)
2






]VH . Using F.O.C. for
θ1 yields θ∗1 =
(1−αδ)(VL−δV∆)−(1−αδ)δVH/2+(1−αδ/2)αδ2VH
2(1−αδ)(VL−δV∆)+(1−αδ/2)αδ2VH










1, since w.r.t. the market segmentation,






















2−αδ , we always have θHVH − αp1 ≥ 0. (It is worth noting that
pu = θHVH − αp1 < θHVH = pH for α > 0.)
The manufacturer’s optimal pricing in the semi-anonymous case, with overlapping pro-
duction in period two:
With cH = 0 in Equation (6), Π
Sp
2 reduces to Π
Sp
2 = [1 − θu]θHV∆ + [θ1 − θH ]θHV∆ +
[θ1 − θL]θLVL. From the first expression, the optimal θu would be as low as possible,
thus θ∗u = θ1. With that, Π
Sp
2 is simplified to Π
Sp
2 = [1 − θH ]θHV∆ + [θ1 − θL]θLVL,
where we obtain θ∗H = θ
∗ and θ∗L = θ̂
∗, using F.O.C. for θH and θL. From period
one, because of the original version being offered in both periods, the cut-off θ1 is ob-
tained from θ1VL + δθ1VL − p1 = δθ1VL − δθLVH ; therefore, p1 = θ1VL + δθLVL and
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for θ1, we get θ∗1 =
1+δ/2
2+δ/2
. This gives θ∗L =
1+δ/2
4+δ
, and we already have θ∗H =
1
2
. (It is worth
mentioning that pu = θHV∆ < θHV∆ + θLVL = pH .)
Proof of Proposition 1. For α = 0 in the results derived above, and after some math-





, which is greater than
ΠSp(θ1) = [1 − θ1]θ1VL + δ V∆4 + δ
θ21
4
VL for any θ1 ∈ [0, 1]. Assume α is such that αp1 in
the optimal solution for no overlapping production equals θLVL in the optimal solution for
overlapping production. Putting it simply, [αp∗1]
Sn = [θ∗LVL]
Sp (note that this α guarantees
θHVH ≥ αp1 in no overlapping production since [θ∗L]Sp ≤ [θ∗H ]Sn and that VH > VL). With
this α, overlapping production has already become more profitable than no overlapping
production for two reasons: the magnitude of the reference point being the same in both
while the market segmentation in the second period of the former pushes its optimal solu-
tion closer to the commitment solution. Given that ΠSn∗ is strictly decreasing in α, there is
an α̂ such that ΠSn∗ = ΠSp∗ for α = α̂, ΠSn∗ > ΠSp∗ for α ∈ [0, α̂), and ΠSn∗ < ΠSp∗ for
α ∈ (α̂, 1]. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2. Based on Proposition 1, for α > α̂ the manufacturer shifts to




2 = [1− θ1]θ1VL + δ[1−
θ∗]θ∗V∆ + δ[1 − θ̂∗]θ̂∗VL, which is the same as the manufacturer’s profit function in the
anonymous case. Using this (ΠSp∗ = ΠA∗) and the last part in the proof of Proposition 1,
we have ΠS∗ > ΠA∗ for α < α̂, and ΠS∗ = ΠA∗ for α ≥ α̂. This completes the proof.
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APPENDIX B
Figure B1: Four possible sourcing policies.
Figure B1 illustrates the four possible sourcing policies with the GLS model. It is noted that
r and θ (representing the customers with extra willing-to-pay for responsibly sourced prod-
ucts) and α (representing the customers with willingness to boycott the buyer in the event
of a violation on its suppliers’ side) can appear independent from each other in the model,
which creates two different socially responsible reactions. For example, when r = 0, i.e.,
when no customer is willing to pay more for responsibly sourced products, we can still see
boycotting behavior by α customers. In this case, the only possible sourcing policies would
be LC and RM, which are created due to the existence of α. On the other hand, this is the
existence of r > 0 by θ customers, regardless of the existence or absence of α, that creates
DS and RN policies (through creating a market segmentation and a price differentiation
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between θ and 1− θ customers). Therefore, when there is no customer willing to pay more
for responsibly sourced products (i.e., there is no notion of r and θ in the model), there
can be no dual-sourcing bias either, and as Table 3.3 shows, both the GLS model and our
behavioral model predict single sourcing (LC or RM, depending on the magnitude of α).
Proofs:
Proof of Lemma 1. LC policy dominates RM policy if ΠLC > ΠRM , that is, (10, 000−




CNR). In the case of low salvage value (salvage value = 0), we have (10, 000 − φα)V −





Proof of Lemma 2. The buyer prefers LC over DS when LC dominates DS. For that, we
should have ΠLC > ΠDS , that is, (10, 000− φα)(V −CNR) > (10, 000− θ)(V −CNR) +
(θ − φα)(V + r − CR), which can be simplified to (θ − φα)(CR − CNR − r) > 0. In the
case of low salvage value (salvage value = 0), we have (10, 000− φα)V − 10, 000CNR >
(10, 000−θ)V +(θ−φα)(V +r)− (10, 000−θ)CNR−θCR for ΠLC > ΠDS , from which
we get θ(CR − CNR)− (θ − φα)r > 0.
Proof of Lemma 3. Similar to the proof of Lemma 2, the buyer prefers RM over DS
when RM dominates DS. For that, we should have ΠRM > ΠDS , that is, 10, 000(V −
CR) > (10, 000 − θ)(V − CNR) + (θ − φα)(V + r − CR), which can be simplified to
φα(V − CNR) − 10, 000(CR − CNR) − (θ − φα)(r − (CR − CNR)) > 0. In the case
of low salvage value (salvage value = 0), we have 10, 000V − 10, 000CR > (10, 000 −
θ)V + (θ − φα)(V + r)− (10, 000− θ)CNR − θCR for ΠRM > ΠDS , from which we get
φαV − 10, 000(CR − CNR) + θ(CR − CNR)− (θ − φα)r > 0.
In the interest of mathematical tractability, proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 are presented
considering uniform values of β’s irrespective of the absence or presence of the encour-
aging reaction. All proofs hold, and strongly so, if we consider a lower β in the presence
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of the encouraging reaction, since it further pushes the inequalities in the directions of the
proofs.
Proof of Proposition 1. When the discouraging reaction (i.e., α) is low, the classical
model’s prediction is either LC or DS, depending on the level of the encouraging reaction
(i.e., r and θ). Suppose r and θ are low so that the classical model predicts LS. With the
behavioral model presented in Equations (1a)-(1b) and (2a)-(2b), the presence of the en-
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)ε for any 0 < ε < 1, and hence the right-hand side
is always negative for any 0 < β < 1. Meanwhile, the left-hand side is always positive
because 0 < 1 − β < 1. Thus, the presence of the encouraging reaction improves respon-
sible sourcing by making a preference for DS over LC. Now suppose r and θ are high so
that the classical model predicts DS. In this case, the encouraging reaction again helps with
responsible sourcing by making a preference for DS over LC.
Similarly, when the discouraging reaction (i.e., α) is high, the classical model’s predic-
tion is either RM or DS, depending on the level of the encouraging reaction (i.e., r and θ).
Suppose r and θ are low so that the classical model predicts RM. With the behavioral model
presented in Equations (1a)-(1b) and (3a)-(3b), the presence of the encouraging reaction
changes the optimal responsible sourcing from 10, 000−β[0 + (10, 000− α
10, 000
)1/ε]10, 000 +
β[1 − (10, 000− α
10, 000
)1/ε]0 to θ − β[0 + (θ − α
θ
)1/ε]θ + β[1 − (θ − α
θ
)1/ε](10, 000 − θ).






)1/ε](10, 000−θ) > 10, 000−β[0+(10, 000− α
10, 000
)1/ε]10, 000+
β[1 − (10, 000− α
10, 000
)1/ε]0. With some mathematical simplifications, this inequality can be
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simplified to (1− β)θ − (1− β)10, 000 > [(θ − α
θ
)1/ε − (10, 000− α
10, 000
)1/ε]10, 000β. Both
sides of this inequality are nonpositive and increasing in θ, but with different slopes. Thus,
we shall look at the bounds of θ. The θ varies between α and 10,000. In the extreme
case, if θ is 10,000, the inequality still does not hold (and needless to mention that when
θ becomes that high, the RM is no longer the optimal policy). When θ equals α, the in-
equality changes to (1− β)α− (1− β)10, 000 > −(10, 000− α
10, 000
)1/ε10, 000β. For a given
α, because 1/ε > 1,
10, 000− α
10, 000







)1/ε = 0, the inequality changes to (1 − β)α − (1 − β)10, 000 > 0,






), the inequality changed to
(1−β)α−(1−β)10, 000 > −(10000−α)β, or equivalently (1−2β)α−(1−2β)10, 000 > 0,
which again will never hold. Thus, the presence of the encouraging reaction is detrimental
to responsible sourcing by making a preference for DS over RM. Now suppose r and θ
are high so that the classical model predicts DS. In this case, the encouraging reaction is
again detrimental to responsible sourcing by making a preference for DS over RM. This
completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2. Here, in the case of a low salvage value (e.g., salvage value = 0),
increasing the discouraging reaction (i.e., α) shows detrimental effect to responsible sourc-
ing by changing the classical optimal policy from DS to LC. With the behavioral model
presented in Equations (1a)-(1a) and (2a)-(2b), in the presence of the encouraging reaction,
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)ε](10, 000 − θ). With some mathematical simplifications, this inequality
can be simplified to θ − (αhigh
θ





)ε(10, 000 − θ) > 0.
119
The left-hand side is strictly decreasing in αhigh and is strictly increasing in αlow, for any
0 < ε < 1. The αlow varies between 0 and αhigh, wherein the αhigh is restricted by θ. When
αlow = 0, we have the inequality as −(
αhigh
θ
)ε10, 000 > 0, which never holds; and when
αlow = αhigh = θ, we have 0 > 0. This completes the proof.
Experimental Descriptions:1
[Starting paragraphs for all Scenarios and groups]
You are selling a product whose retail price, i.e., the price that you receive from customers
when you sell the product to them, is $80 per unit. The total demand for the product is
constant and equal to 10, 000 units, i.e., there are 10, 000 customers in the market, and
each customer will buy only one product. To sell the product to these customers, you need to
procure it from a supplier in advance. You can procure the product from two suppliers: an
expensive but socially responsible supplier (supplier R) and/or a cheap but nonresponsible
supplier (supplier N).
Supplier R abides with social and environmental obligations, and there is no chance that
it violates these obligations. Supplier N has a φ% chance of violating these obligations.
The purchasing cost, i.e., the price that you have to pay the supplier to procure the product,
from supplier R is $CR per unit, and the purchasing cost from supplier N is $CNR per
unit.
[Control groups of Scenarios 1 and 2]
α of the 10, 000 customers will refuse to buy the product from you if any violation occurs
on your suppliers’ side. Product that you have procured but not sold due to a violation will
be returned to the supplier for full refund of the purchase cost.
[Treatment groups of Scenarios 1 and 2]
θ of the 10, 000 customers are socially conscious customers. These customers will pay
1Parameter values in each round are randomly drawn from the intervals presented in Table B1.
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$r more for the product, i.e., $(80 + r) instead of $80, if the product is procured from
supplier R instead of supplier N. In addition,α of these θ socially conscious customers will
refuse to buy the product from you if a violation occurs on your suppliers’ side. Products
that you have procured but not sold due to a violation will be returned to the supplier for
full refund of the purchase cost.
If you procure from the same supplier to both customer groups (socially conscious and
regular), you cannot offer the product at a different price for different customer groups,
and you will therefore sell the product at the same price of $80 to all customers.
[Control and treatment groups of Scenario 3]
θ of the 10, 000 customers are socially conscious customers. These customers will pay
$r more for the product, i.e., $(80 + r) instead of $80, if the product is procured from
supplier R instead of supplier N. In addition,α of these θ socially conscious customers will
refuse to buy the product from you if a violation occurs on your suppliers’ side. Products
that you have not sold will have no salvage value.
If you procure from the same supplier to both customer groups (socially conscious and
regular), you cannot offer the product at a different price for different customer groups,
and you will therefore sell the product at the same price of $80 to all customers.
[Closing paragraph for all Scenarios and groups]
Your objective is tomaximize your profit. What are your order quantities from
supplier R and supplier N?
Order quantity from supplier R: Order quantity from supplier N:
Parameter ranges in the experiment:
Table B1 shows the parameter ranges from which the parameter values in each round were
randomly drawn. Parameter ranges are choses in a way to keep the same ranges for the
control and treatment groups and keep the source of difference at the parameter of ma-
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Table B1: Parameter ranges in the experiment.
nipulation. Profits presented in each scenario are the average profits over 500 simulation
runs (in each simulation run, a set of parameter values was generated by randomly drawing
the parameter values from the parameter ranges, and the profits were calculated using the
GLS formulations). As seen, in each scenario, the buyer will earn more profit by choosing
the rational optimal sourcing policy, while the dual-sourcing bias in the treatment groups
will result in choosing a sourcing policy with lower profit. It is noted that we do not use an
affine transformation of the profits, similar to what Ho et al. (2010) did in their newsvendor
problem, to create significant gaps in the profits as it is not the focus of our study. That is,
in their newsvendor problem, it is important to study how much profit the newsvendor loses
due to not sticking with the theoretical optimal, and hence such significant gaps matter in
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studying the magnitude of the effect. In our context, however, the effect is about changes
in the amount of nonresponsible sourcing resulted from not sticking with the theoretical
optimal policy, which we have built our analyses on. For instance, in the first scenario in
Table B1, even if DS and LC had the exact same profit, what matters for our study is how
the existence of the encouraging reaction in the treatment group results in a significantly
lower amount of nonresponsible sourcing in this group, compared with that in the control
group. As mentioned in the experimental procedure, final payments (after completing all
20 rounds) were adjusted in order to keep reasonable and comparable monetary payments




Below are the experimental descriptions for the Standard-Green order. In the Green-
Standard order, Question 1 asks about the willingness to pay for the Green version, and
then Question 2 asks about the willingness to pays for the Green and Standard versions.
Question 1
[for regular/new buyers] Imagine you already have an almost-new TV at home. You are
thinking about buying an extra one for another room.
[for emergency/replacement buyers] Imagine your TV is not working anymore, and you
need to buy a new one.
[with free recycling] One of the largest electronic retailers would be a good place to shop.
This retailer also has a recycling program and accepts broken TVs for recycling free of
charge.
[with $7 recycling tax] One of the largest electronic retailers would be a good place to shop.
This retailer also has a recycling program and, due to the cost of managing TV recycling,
charges a $7 recycling fee in addition to the sale price for all TVs, regardless of the brand
or technical specifications.
[with $25 charge for recycling] One of the largest electronic retailers would be a good place
to shop. This retailer also has a recycling program and, due to the cost of managing TV
recycling, charges $25 to accept broken TVs for recycling.
[with free recycling and $25 charge for recycling] Assume that the technical specifications
of the TV below meet your basic criteria. How much (in dollars) would you be willing to
pay for this TV?
[with $7 recycling tax] Assume that the technical specifications of the TV below meet your
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You indicated that you would pay $[price indicated in Question 1] for the TV you were
shown.
Assume you find there is also a Green version of that TV (as shown below). It has the exact
same features as the standard one, while it is also designed for increased recyclability at its
end-of-life.
[with free recycling and $25 charge for recycling] In light of this new information, how
much (in dollar) would you be willing to pay for each of these TVs?
[with $7 recycling tax] In light of this new information, how much (in dollar) would you
be willing to pay for each of these TVs (inclusive of the $7 fee)?
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Price for the Standard version: ——-
Price for the Green version: ——-
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